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ABSTRACT 
 The conceptualization of the personality construct of introversion has been problematic 
since the term’s inception due to the complexity and seemingly self-contradictory nature of the 
collection of attributes of which it is comprised.  To advance the understanding of introversion, I 
propose that it is a continuous segment of the non-clinical part of the autism spectrum, and that it 
is not the same as the inverse of extraversion.  When introversion and autism are placed on the 
same continuum, the nature of the relationship of the traits becomes more apparent, and new 
possibilities are available for exploration of both autism and introversion.  This review of 
literature traces the origins and development of the concept of introversion and places it on the 
autism spectrum, demonstrating the apparent synonymous nature of the traits despite varying 
degrees of severity in expression.  The current factorial structure of introversion demonstrates 
how autistic features interact to produce the personality dimension.  Other factors, including 
genetic predisposition, relationships to the clinical and non-clinical symptoms of schizophrenia 
spectrum expression, and neurological findings that support the correlation will be considered.  
Finally, suggestions for future research and possible theoretical and empirical implications and 
applications are explored. 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
From its naissance, the concept of introversion has been indispensable in defining a 
critical aspect of personality despite its ambiguous and elusive definition.  The centuries-old 
dichotomy of the quiet, pensive, reclusive introvert and his sociable, talkative, and bold 
extraverted counterpart has been explained with a similarly simple underlying difference: the 
tendency to focus outward or inward.  In modern psychology Jung (1923) used the term 
“introversion” to refer to a turning inward of energy, set on a continuum with “extraversion,” or 
a turning of energy outward, on the opposing end.  However, the placement of introversion and 
extraversion on opposite ends of the same continuum is a problematic assumption, conceptually 
and empirically.  Hogan and Cheek (1983) explain that the “…construct and predictive validity 
[of introversion] are enhanced by using separate internally consistent measures that focus on 
single personality attributes” (p. 343).  Grimes (2008) argues that the presence or absence of 
introversion is not indicative of the presence or absence of extraversion.  Similarly, Hogan and 
Cheek (1983) describe several aspects of inner- versus outer- orientation, showing that these 
dimensions appear to be two distinct dimensions, not opposite ends of the same spectrum.  A 
better conceptual model of introversion is required. 
As one of the foundational dimensions of personality that impacts one’s level of effective 
function and well-being including cognitive, social, and financial success, introversion helps 
determine one’s risk for certain psychopathologies (Wilt & Revelle, 2009).  The definition of this 
personality dimension that includes the subtleties and complexities inherent in a comprehensive 
conceptual and operational definition is critical to our understanding of many aspects of 
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 personality, including its role in clinical conditions.  A new framework is necessary for proper 
definition of introversion as its own domain of personality. 
The present study proposes that introversion should be placed on the autism spectrum, as 
indicated by consistencies and overlap of introversion and autism definitions.  The personality 
dimension of introversion appears to exemplify a collection of traits and tendencies consistent 
with non-clinical autism.  The colloquial sense and the formal conceptualization and 
operationalization of introversion have been in close proximity due to their dynamic of iterative 
refinement and mutual reinforcement.  However, this paper outlines the feasibility of a new 
definition and offers a model for this explication. The similarities between autism, as defined by 
the DSM-IV-TR (see below), and introversion will be seen most clearly where they would 
conceptually intersect: severe but non-clinical introversion and high-functioning autism.  
However, the model proposed here is broader: as a continuum-model, less severe expressions of 
introversion and more severe expressions of autism would be present at more distal points.  
Complexities inherent in such an inclusive model are addressed in later sections by explaining 
component weightings, and by observation of an adjusted (and observably different) result when 
some traits are expressed more strongly than others.  For example, while Asperger’s Syndrome is 
relevant to this discussion, in Asperger’s the primary impairment is social  (higher social 
component weightings relative to other facets), but other aspects of introversion-autism would be 
less affected. 
I begin by presenting an overview to introduce the concepts, terms, and reasoning for the 
formation of this hypothesis.  Chapter 2 uses the theoretical framework of the autism-
introversion single continuum model to outline the early history of the development of 
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 introversion as a personality construct.  Chapter 3 continues the historical review from Jung’s 
conceptualization through present conceptualizations, demonstrating the placement of 
introversion on the autism spectrum through these iterative theoretical refinements.  As Jung’s 
model is the primary basis for current views of introversion, the development of the term in 
Chapter 3 builds upon the proposed introversion-extraversion continuum model introduced in the 
preceding chapter.  However, new correlates are introduced, and potential new facets of 
introversion are identified with the development of the term.  These are compared to similar 
phenomena in autism, thus yielding greater support for the proposed single continuum autism-
introversion model.  Chapter 3 concludes with the introduction of Laney’s (2002) 
operationalization of introversion, and Chapter 4 introduces the four-factor model (Grimes, 
2005) to clarify some of the conceptual flaws of the previous model.  This four-factor model 
describes four subtypes of introversion: social, thinking, anxious, and inhibited forms.  The 
factorial framework outlined here will form the basis of further conceptual analysis of the 
autism-introversion spectrum. 
The remaining sections of this thesis transition from definition and historical background 
to exploring how introversion and autism fit together and define this continuum.  The four 
factors are taken individually, but each chapter presents them in dynamic with other aspects of 
introversion to demonstrate how these factors relate to each other to create the relationship of 
features that typifies introversion at the non-clinical part of the continuum, and autism in its more 
severe expression.  The fifth chapter defines and describes social introversion empirically and 
conceptually, and it takes into account findings from autism literature to inform potential causes 
for the social approach that is characteristic of the temperament.  Chapter 6 introduces thinking 
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 introversion, and it describes what it is and the forms that it may take.  The resultant thought 
patterns and their relationships with other aspects of life (including social introversion) are 
explored.  Chapter 7 continues the factorial deconstruction of introversion to follow negative 
patterns emerging from tendencies evident in thinking introversion.  Anxious introversion may 
have a number of causes and correlates, so its relationships with the other introverted facets and 
with these contributing factors are discussed.  Chapter 9 addresses the fourth subtype of 
introversion: the inhibited type.  This section discusses the ways that this subtype relates to the 
other factors and explanations from other introversion models and autism findings. 
The factorial model is useful for describing the relationship that appears to create that 
which is termed “autism” or “introversion,” but it is not complete.  Other factors, including 
genetic and neurofunctional factors, are examined.  I also allow for an expansion of the 
continuum-model to account for trait variation, and I propose more empirical testing to explore 
further possible neurobiological correlates.  The conclusion in Chapter 10 is a refinement and 
restatement of the model, demonstrating its simplicity and complexity such that it may be 
properly applied.  The final chapter is a suggested design for an exploratory psychometric study 
to find support for the autism-introversion single continuum hypothesis. 
 
Overview 
Introversion 
The problem of proper definition of introversion as a cardinal personality dimension is 
made more urgent by possible clinical implications of any such relationship.  Wilt and Revelle 
(2009) describe how our understanding of introversion and extraversion might shape our 
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 perspectives on psychopathologies, the connection between the two may be more direct than a 
mere correlation: the overlap of the two is instrumental in our attempts to describe both the 
clinical condition and the personality dimension.  Jung’s empirical sample that was used to 
represent introversion for many years (Freyd, 1924) was a clinical population of patients with 
“dysthymia,” a chronic but less severe form of unipolar depression, studied in a hospital setting.  
In more recent years, introversion has been confused with other terms such as “shyness.”  
Despite these connections, the clinical conceptualization was lost over time. 
A plethora of mainstream literature recently emerged with a positive spin in favor of 
“The Happy Introvert” (Wagele, 2006), “The Introvert Advantage” (Laney, 2002), and “Introvert 
Power” (Helgoe, 2008).  The analogy to dysthymia has aptly been lost over the years. Though 
dysthymia alone does not resemble introversion, a case may be made for similarities between 
autism and introversion.  The comparison to a clinical condition is possible, as the extreme pole 
of normal behavior may classify clinical behavior (Wilt & Revelle, 2009).  The extreme end of 
introversion, taken to the point of imbalance and maladaptive behavior, inflexibility, and 
inappropriate behavior in a given situation may characterize autism. 
The definition of introversion is complex, underdeveloped, and often contradictory.  
Eysenck (1947) used the term “introversion” as the opposite of “extraversion,” which he used to 
describe an outgoing, sociable, enthusiastic, and somewhat impulsive personality.  The single 
continuum model for introversion-extraversion as a personality dimension was operationalized as 
one of the five basic domains of personality (McAdams, 2000).  The five-factor model was 
subdivided by Costa and McCrae (1992) to create the NEO-PI-R, a personality inventory that 
measures the facets of the “Big Five” factors of Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
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 Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.  There are six extraversion facets, including warmth, 
gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement-seeking, and positive emotions.  Examples of 
representative items for each facet are in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: NEO-PI-R Extraversion Facets___________________________________________ 
Extraversion facets: 
 Warmth: friendly, warm, sociable, cheerful, affectionate, outgoing 
  “I really like most people I meet” 
Gregariousness: sociable, pleasure-seeking, talkative, spontaneous 
  “I like to have a lot of people around me” 
 Assertiveness: aggressive, confident, self-confidant, forceful, enthusiastic 
  “I am dominant, forceful, and assertive” 
 Activity: energetic, hurried, quick, determined, active, aggressive 
  “My life is fast-paced” 
Excitement-seeking: pleasure-seeking, daring, adventurous, charming, handsome, 
spunky, clever 
  “I like to be where the action is” 
 Positive emotions: humorous, praising, spontaneous, optimistic, jolly 
  “I am a cheerful, high-spirited person” 
 
 
 
This conceptualization was refined only slightly over time to involve a more direct 
description of the necessary constellation of traits.  As such, introversion is described as the 
inverse of extraversion, but direct definition has replaced implied but unstated content. 
Introversion is commonly categorized by a preference of “depth” over “breadth” of 
interpersonal relationships that is associated with the tendency to have few close social 
connections instead of many superficial relationships, limited numbers but great passion in 
interests, and difficulty in changing or juggling tasks.  Also present is a predisposition to be 
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 easily overwhelmed and to experience sensory sensitivity, a preference for “quiet” solitary 
activities, and low excitement-seeking and activity preferences (e.g., Jung, 1923; Aron & Aron, 
1997; Costa & McCrae, 1992; McAdams, 2000.)  Introverts are also characterized as 
“withdrawn, retiring, reserved, inhibited, quiet, and deliberate” (McAdams, 2000, p. 305).  They 
prefer professions that include less interaction, often working as artists, mathematicians, 
engineers, and researchers, and they prefer striving for accuracy over speed.  Introversion 
appears to be a complex trait that impacts all aspects of one’s life.  However, it is also a rather 
ambiguous construct that has elicited conflict and confusion regarding its meaning and 
mechanism. 
This view is encapsulated by the work of Laney (2002), whose conceptual definition of 
introversion defies shyness and social reclusion due to associated anxiety, despite her operational 
inclusion of such markers.  She defines introversion to include confusion, fluctuation in 
behaviors and attitudes, difficult communication, rumination, anxiety, anxious self-
preoccupation, the tendency to be easily overwhelmed, low energy, a disdain for social functions 
of any degree of formality, and sporadic overwhelming amounts of energy.  Laney’s picture of 
confusion and contradiction, coupled with the tendency to become overwhelmed, hints toward 
clinical implications.  She explains that an introvert is “…easily overstimulated by the external 
world, experiencing the uncomfortable feeling of ‘too much.’  This can feel like antsyness or 
torpor.”  She continues that one can lose “…other perspectives and connections” (p.19).  The in-
depth narrow focus is overwhelmed by breadth, as detail-focus may cause one to become 
overwhelmed by larger patterns that one prefers to ignore.  As clinical symptoms are marked by 
discomfort, dysfunction, distress, and/or dangerousness to the self and/or others, the “traits” of 
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 introversion may aptly be considered symptoms of undiagnosed psychological illness, if they are 
sufficiently severe to be characterized as such. 
 
Autism 
Autism is a developmental disorder that involves abnormal social and communication 
development that results in impaired social interaction and difficulty with communication, a 
tendency to engage in repetitive behavior and utterances, and limited and obsessive interests (de 
Bildt et al., 2009; DSM-IV-TR; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  Studies also show selectively 
enhanced perceptual sensitivity and altered perception (see Baron-Cohen et al., 2009).  The 
DSM-IV-TR defines autism as follows: 
A. A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two from (1), and 
one each from (2) and (3) 
 
(1) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least two of the 
following: 
(a)  marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-
eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social 
interaction 
(b) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level 
(c) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or achievements 
with other people (e.g., by a lack of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects 
of interest) 
(d) lack of social or emotional reciprocity 
 
(2) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one of the 
following: 
(a) delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken language (not 
accompanied by an attempt to compensate through alternative modes of 
communication such as gesture or mime) 
(b) in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to 
initiate or sustain a conversation with others 
(c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic language 
(d) lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social imitative play 
appropriate to developmental level 
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(3) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests and activities, 
as manifested by at least two of the following: 
(a) encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and restricted 
patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or focus 
(b) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals 
(c) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand or finger flapping or 
twisting, or complex whole-body movements) 
(d) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
 
B.  Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following areas, with onset prior 
to age 3 years: 
 
(1) social interaction, 
(2) language as used in social communication, or 
(3) symbolic or imaginative play (DSM-IV-TR) 
 
 Autism is a “spectrum” disorder, indicating varying degrees of symptom severity.  Based 
upon this categorization, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001) noted that there is a resultant 
theoretical population who demonstrate a less severe collection of symptoms that may be tested 
empirically.  In response, they introduced the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (ASQ), a “…brief, self-
administered instrument for measuring the degree to which an adult with normal intelligence has 
the traits associated with the autism spectrum” (p.5).  The ASQ assesses five main areas: social 
skill, attention-switching, attention to detail, communication, and imagination.  While Baron-
Cohen and colleagues hypothesize that there was no such comprehensive psychometric measure 
for non-clinical autism symptomology, one might be able to make the case that such a scale may 
simply have been hiding in introversion literature. 
 
Possible overlap between autism and introversion 
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 Some researchers have undertaken to categorize the constellation of traits associated with 
autism spectrum disorder as a separate dimension of personality.  Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ 
(2001) Autism-Spectrum Quotient is intended to measure the presence of these traits in a non-
clinical population.  Wakabayashi and colleagues (2006) explored the relationship between the 
Big Five personality dimensions as measured by the NEO-PI-r and the Autism-Spectrum 
Questionnaire (ASQ).  They found a negative correlation with Extraversion (r = -.434, p<.01), 
which indicates an introverted component.  Neuroticism showed a positive correlation with ASQ 
scores (r = .289, p<.01), but authors suggest that autism is a separate personality dimension, 
based upon joint factor analyses.  While it is possible that this theory may have some practical 
merit for exploration of the trait in the general population, it is also possible that the 
psychometric measures used are not comprehensive and conclusive measures of the traits that 
they seek to explore.  For instance, the NEO-PI-r follows the Big Five model of personality, 
which necessarily assumes that introversion is the opposite of extraversion.  As a result, 
extraversion items can be reverse-scored to represent introversion, or they can be expected to 
correlate negatively with “introverted” traits.  However, it is not merely the presence of certain 
traits that create the greater personality.  The interaction of the traits with each other and with the 
environment do not allow for such a simplistic model to detail the function of the individual 
outside of the theoretical realm.  In fact, introversion is often described as a difficult 
temperament for an individual who must assume coping strategies to survive in an extraverted 
culture. 
 Greater problems are evident with this model in a simple deconstruction: Jung (1923) 
indicated that an individual channels energy outward or inward.  However, it is likewise possible 
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 that individuals have different levels of energy as part of their individual differences, or that they 
might not be channeling energy in a singular favored direction.  That is to say that the individual 
who is not currently engaged at an energetic party, for example, is not necessarily partaking in 
constructive thought or other inward processes.  Similarly, Freud’s (1918) introduction of the 
concept of fixation rendered some of this energy unavailable.  Therefore, it is not possible to 
base the definition of energetic usage on a singular continuum.  Once specific preferences and 
tendencies emerge, they also interact with each other and with the environment to produce a 
personality.  Causal direction is unclear.  For instance, an individual may have a strong fantasy 
life, or what Aron and Aron (1997) term a “rich inner life.”  This would cause one to place 
oneself in situations that favor indulgence of these preferences.  Other associated features of 
introversion would support these tendencies toward maintenance of one’s inner life, as well.  For 
example, social reclusion may be a passive withdrawal from others that arises from an active 
pursuit of fantasy.  The reason for the overt behaviors will cause certain constellations to emerge 
to support these needs and desires. 
 Revisiting the psychometric puzzle draws out these same problems: which traits emerge, 
what drives these traits, how are they weighted, and is it possible for introverted experience to be 
similar for many individuals whose reason for withdrawing into one’s inner world is the same?  
Studies specific to introversion do highlight traits and dispositions that are not simple inverses of 
those associated with extraversion.  However, they may be specific to certain manifestations of 
introversion, and not to others.  Perhaps the findings of Wakabayashi and colleagues’ (2006) will 
be useful to guide us toward a new conceptualization of autism and introversion, but one that 
highlights specific components of introversion that are not simple correlates between selected 
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 facets of the inverse of introversion and that singular component measure of high-functioning 
autism. 
 A more in-depth study of introversion (Grimes, 2005) revealed a clustering of introverted 
traits into four subgroups: social, thinking, anxious, and inhibited.  Researchers used several 
measures of components of introversion and related constructs to explore the convergent and 
discriminant validity of Laney’s (2002) Introversion Scale.  They found that her scale contained 
two independent factors, and that other conceptualized (but ineffectively operationalized) 
components of introversion were not well represented.  A collection of these measures could be 
used to detail the four subtypes of introversion.  The results indicate that these factors of 
introversion may represent the varying collections of specific constellations of introverted 
dimensions.  While autism may show correlation with the inverse of extraversion, a more in-
depth consideration of what introversion actually is and how it relates to neuroticism and other 
correlates demonstrates the strength of the model of a singular introversion-autism continuum 
with differentially integrated subcomponents whose total weight dictates placement according to 
severity on the spectrum. 
The overlap of definitions of introversion and autism in regard to social discomfort and 
the tendency to avoid social situations, the difficulty in attention switching and changing task or 
stuck-in-set perseveration, and the attention to detail, coupled with a lack of ease in producing 
conversation points toward conceptual overlap between the two constructs.  Additionally, in both 
autism and introversion, we see an inhibited component, discomfort with and avoidance of 
novelty, detail focus and a proclivity to become overwhelmed, and a tendency to be 
misunderstood.  These similarities find some empirical support, as researchers have found higher 
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 scores on measures of introversion, repression, and social discomfort in adults with autism-
spectrum disorders than in controls (Ozonoff et al., 2005).  Other published links between autism 
and introversion appear to be inadvertent comparisons for convenience in summarization, and 
they draw in the similar and overlapping schizophrenia spectrum disorders.  For instance, Meehl 
(1989) describes schizotaxia with the potentiators of introversion and anxiety, and a personality 
with autistic traits.  Dellaert (1958) explains “instinctive-reactive” dispositions “whose need for 
communicative relationships remains tied by an introverted, even autistic, attitude toward life 
experiences, leading to feelings of inferiority” (p. 254, italics added).  Here, the remaining traits 
of a lack of assertiveness but increased fantasy (as shown in Grimes, 2005) and diminished 
communicative skills (Laney, 2002) are brought together in the continuum of the autism 
spectrum with support for inclusion of autistic, introverted, and schizophrenic traits when 
differential expression of these traits is allowed. 
The conceptual overlap between introversion and autism is present in the predominant 
measures of both constructs.  Table 2 provides a comparison of items taken from Laney’s (2002) 
Introversion Scale with similar items from the ASQ (2001). 
 
Table 2: Introversion and Autism_________________________________________________ 
 
Social Skills: 
Introversion: 
“I like to share special occasions with just one person or a few close friends, 
rather than having big celebrations.” 
“I feel drained after social situations, even when I enjoy myself.” 
 Autism: 
  “I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own.” (reverse-scored) 
  “I would rather go to a library than a party.” 
  “I enjoy social occasions.” (reverse-scored) 
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Attention Switching: 
 Introversion: 
“When I work on projects, I like to have larger uninterrupted time periods rather 
than smaller chunks.” 
“I can ‘zone out’ if too much is going on.” 
“I often feel uncomfortable in new surroundings.” 
 Autism: 
“I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other 
things.” 
“I find it easy to do more than one thing at once.” (reverse-scored) 
“New situations make me anxious.” 
 
Attention to Detail: 
 Introversion: 
  “I tend to notice details many people don’t see.” 
 Autism: 
  “I tend to notice details that others do not. 
 
Communication: 
 Introversion: 
“I sometimes rehearse things before speaking, occasionally writing notes for 
myself.” 
  “I usually need to think before I respond or speak.” 
  “I often dread returning phone calls” 
“I find my mind sometimes goes blank when I meet people or when I am asked to 
speak unexpectedly.” 
“I talk slowly or have gaps in my words, especially if I am tired or if I am trying 
to speak and think at once.” 
 Autism: 
  “I enjoy social chit-chat.” (reverse-scored) 
  “I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation going.” 
  “I am good at social chit-chat.” (reverse-scored) 
 
Imagination: 
 Introversion: 
  “I am creative and/or imaginative.” 
 Autism: 
“If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind.” 
(reverse-scored) 
 
Hypersensitivity: 
 Introversion: 
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 “I don’t like overstimulating environments. I can’t imagine why folks want to go 
to horror movies or go on roller coasters.” 
“I sometimes have strong reactions to smells, tastes, foods, weather, noises, etc.” 
 Autism: 
“I often notice small sounds when others do not.” 
 
 
The five facets of autism spectrum that Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001) proposed 
show considerable overlap, with only one facet that is projected to have an inverse correlation in 
the current study: imagination.  The fact that imagination is an important part of both constructs 
may have interesting implications, though the valence may indicate that overlap shows similarity 
and interrelatedness, but not synonymous definition.  The reason for the discrepancy may be 
found in other factors, such as impaired IQ, increased anxiety, or other confounds that may 
produce this observed effect.  Certain types of introversion may also correlate differently with a 
creativity factor.  For example, anxious and inhibited introversion may correlate with lower 
creativity scores (Grimes, 2005).  Another potential explanation for disassociation of creativity 
from other autistic traits rests in the overlap of schizophrenia and autism as classified by the 
DSM-IV-TR.  There are notable distinguishing factors between the two diagnoses including 
prevalence within differing age groups (later onset for schizophrenia that is typically between 
late teens and early thirties and early onset of autism no later than three years of age), higher 
incidence of autism in males and schizophrenia in females, and the marked presence of 
hallucinations and delusions in schizophrenia and not in autism.  However, the two diagnoses 
include core features of social withdrawal, communicative impairment, preference for the 
abstract, and affective flattening.  Perceived creativity may be resultant of interrelatedness of 
autism and schizophrenia (for an example of correlations of schizophrenia and creativity, see 
Rawlings & Locarnini, 2008), imposition of a compensatory strength to counter the “problem” of 
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 a lack of sociability (e.g., the introverted form of the “gifts of shyness” (Avila, 2002), or it may 
actually be present in autism, but not yet clarified by the DSM-IV-TR definition (Rawlings & 
Locarnini, 2008).  Such studies that link creativity with autism and schizotypal traits lend greater 
strength to the inclusion of creativity as an aspect of thinking introversion as autism and 
introversion are considered along the same continuum. 
Table 2 demonstrates that sensory hypersensitivity is also empirically supported for both 
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009) and introversion (Laney, 2002 and Aron & Aron, 1997).  
Baron-Cohen and colleagues did not give a thorough test of this category of sensitivity, but it is 
represented within the category of “attention to detail.”  Aron and Aron (1997) introduced a 
“frazzle/withdraw” reaction to overstimulation, and Laney’s (2002) Introversion Scale includes 
such items as well (ex: “I sometimes have strong reactions to smells, tastes, foods, weather, 
noises, etc.”).  The “high sensory processing sensitivity” construct is captured in Aron and 
Aron’s (1997) “Highly Sensitive Person Scale,” which assesses aesthetic orientation, sensory 
hypersensitivity, and the tendency to become overwhelmed by sensory input and to withdraw.  
The apparent differences between the introversion and autism scales are not indicative of a 
conceptual variance; they appear to take slightly different approaches to measurement of the 
same phenomenon, possibly showing differentiation in degree and wording, as described by 
Block (1995) as the “jingle-jangle” problem.  Therefore, exploration of these concepts might 
benefit through improvement of construct explication, or the ability to operationalize the terms 
properly may be contingent upon proper conceptual reframing.  That is to say, Block’s “jingle-
jangle” problem appears to describe the tendency of conflicting definitions and conflicting 
descriptive terms to constrain both theory and research. 
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The argument 
A better description of both autism and introversion and greater clarity in our use of these 
terms are possible if it can be determined whether autism (as posited thus far through the 
psychometric account through Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ (2001) proposed goal) and 
introversion lie on the same continuum.  Thus, the purpose of the present study is to assess the 
feasibility of the existence and nature of the relationship between introversion and autism, 
especially with respect to high-functioning autism or Asperger’s Syndrome.  If these constructs 
lie along the same “spectrum,” then we may be able to enrich our understanding of both autism 
and introversion and the behavioral expressions that are common or disparate indicators of social 
and communicative competency, and to improve our operationalization such that our theory is 
more cohesive, our understanding enriched, and subsequent measures are more comprehensive 
and descriptive. 
The most effective way to explain the history of introversion is to place it within the 
autism spectrum as an attenuated expression of the same constellation of traits.  This framework 
allows for a novel perspective on an old problem.  The introversion-neutral movement (e.g., 
Jung, 1923) was re-interpreted to be identified as a negative statement about the construct in 
comparison to its favored counterpart of extraversion, especially as it was adapted over time 
(e.g., Meares, 1958; Costa & McCrae, 1992).  The introversion-positive movement followed 
(e.g., Wagele, 2006; Laney, 2002; Aron & Aron, 1997).  The view must be rebalanced to be 
comprehensive and representative of introversion. 
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 It is not simply the theorist’s bias that confounds the study of introversion.  Besides the 
complications that emerge from the question of valence, it is unclear how these traits relate to 
each other or how they could be conceptually or experientially linked without using the 
framework of the autism spectrum.  The tendency to have “gaps” in one’s speech, to experience 
one’s mind “going blank,” to be easily “frazzled” or overwhelmed, to pay particularly close 
attention to details, coupled with social withdrawal and thought patterns that show a 
characteristic preference for a subjective consideration of reality or the creation of a different one 
yields a complicated picture that can no longer be considered the simple inverse of extraversion.  
As McWilliams (2006) points out, the complicated concept that is meant by “introversion” is 
different from the “preference for introspection and solitary pursuits” (p. 2) that is implied by 
understanding introversion as the Jungian inverse of extraversion (also in Costa & McCrae, 
1992). McWilliam’s (2006) preference for the term “schizoid,” however, is somewhat inaccurate 
and does not adequately address all aspects of the temperament. 
We seem to be describing something that simply fails to make sense as a basic 
temperament and is at odds with the previous social/thinking conceptualization if we do not 
consider how all of these traits that have come to characterize introversion fit together in 
functional context in its more extreme, clinical manifestation.  Inward orientation, fantasy, and 
reflection, seem not to connect with low activity and excitement-seeking, communication 
problems, and social anhedonia (the inability to experience pleasure derived from social 
interaction).  Introversion must be considered in a new way such that the attempts at definition 
and model construction that have been unsuccessful for over two millennia may finally begin to 
form a cohesive picture.  
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 Allowing introversion to be defined as a trait set of variable component weightings that 
exists on a continuum offers more potential for construct development and explication than the 
attempt to systematically frame the “temperament” differently based upon desired connotations.  
Placing introversion on the non-clinical, less extreme end of the autism spectrum allows for the 
constellation of traits to be understood in proper context and lacking the former obscurity from 
imposed bias of perspective valence. 
 
Connotations of introversion 
The wide variability and ambiguity involved in the terminology and conception of 
introversion coheres in a common set of certain recognized tendencies.  These include priorities 
that include interests and actions of “territoriality; concentration; internal; depth; intensive; 
limited relationships; energy conservation; internal reactions; reflective; think, then speak” 
(Kroeger & Thuesen, 1988, p. 35).  Kroeger and Thuesen report that, “of all the Typewatching 
letters, according to Jung, the division between Extraverts and Introverts is the most important 
distinction between people, because it describes the source, direction, and focus for one’s 
energy” (p. 36).  Introversion is also equated with energy gained through reflection, 
introspection, and attentional depth.  Costa and McCrae (1992) define introversion as the 
opposite of extraversion, which includes the following adjectives: friendly, warm, sociable, 
cheerful, affectionate, outgoing, pleasure-seeking, talkative, spontaneous, aggressive, assertive, 
self-confident, forceful, enthusiastic, confident, energetic, hurried, quick, determined, active, 
daring, adventurous, charming, handsome, spunky, clever, humorous, praising, optimistic, and 
jolly.  Introverts are shy, aloof, and withdrawn, as well.  Keirsey and Bates (1984) take a slightly 
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 different approach to introversion, since intuition/sensation, thinking/feeling, and 
judging/perceiving divide the traits somewhat differently, and some of the nuances that 
constitute our understanding of introversion result from its interaction with other traits.  The 
introversion-extraversion distinction is based upon the tendency to feel energized by social 
interaction (extraversion) versus the tendency to seek isolation to recover energy (introversion).  
This is marked by a sense of territoriality: private places in the mind and environment are 
preserved for a restful retreat.  Introverts are said to feel lonely even when in the presence of 
many other people, feeling “a deep sense of isolation and disconnectedness” (p. 15) despite the 
plethora of people around them.  The external/internal, breadth/depth foci are consistent with 
Costa and McCrae’s definition of introversion. 
Popular conceptualizations of introversion include a sense of being overwhelmed (Aron 
& Aron, 1997; Laney, 2002; Rufus, 2003), a sense of being different (Laney, 2002, Rufus, 
2003), alienated (Rufus, 2003), a preference for solitary activities (for example, Laney, 2002, 
Rufus, 2003; present also in Jung, 1923), disrupted circadian rhythms (Rufus, 2003), differences 
in perception and imagination (Rufus, 2003; Aron & Aron, 1997; Laney, 2002), a sense of 
superiority and esoteric knowledge (Laney, 2002; Aron & Aron, 1997; Rufus, 2003), and the 
feeling that interaction is “draining” (Aron & Aron, 1997; Laney, 2002), “work,” an “ordeal” and 
“barrier” to knowledge (Rufus, 2003).  Also included is the tendency to withdraw when one is 
overwhelmed (Laney, 2002; Aron & Aron, 1997) or upset (Rufus, 2003).  Laney (2002) notes 
the tendency of introverts to avoid eye contact.  Rufus also draws the comparison to clinical 
groups with ADHD and social phobia, but she notes the social reclusion and “repetitive 
relentlessness” that autism and introversion share.  For the latter phenomenon, the change in 
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 terminology to  “perseveration”  obscures the extent of clinical implications and the 
commonality of the behavior between the two conditions. She never resolves this matter, though 
it does raise an interesting point in setting forth popular receptiveness to understanding both 
autism and introversion in terms that might clarify both, an endeavor for both the scientific 
community and the “misunderstood” (Laney, 2002) general population who seek to understand 
themselves better. 
 Baron-Cohen and his colleagues (2001) use the Autism-Spectrum Quotient to examine 
the presence of autism-spectrum traits in the general population.  As a “spectrum” disorder, the 
qualities that fall under the umbrella term of “autism” demonstrate great variability in extent and 
with certain distinguishing features.   However, even with this variation, the description of 
autism-spectrum traits overlaps significantly with those of introversion.  As sociability versus 
withdrawal and communication styles/aptitudes characterize the extraversion-introversion 
dynamic, we find that social withdrawal, social competence, and communicative difficulties are 
the main features of Asperger’s Disorder traits and high-functioning autism.  Many other features 
of introversion unrelated to extraversion, and irreconcilable and seemingly contradictory as they 
seem by current conceptualizations, begin to take shape if we view them as the non-clinical end 
of autistic typology. 
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 CHAPTER 2: EARLY HISTORY 
 The previous chapter provides a basic description of introversion and autism, and of the 
challenges that face empirical and conceptual development of both.  It also demonstrates the 
feasibility of the development of a model that places introversion and autism on the same 
continuum.  I will build upon these definitions to demonstrate the historical significance of this 
new model, and to show how the development of our understanding of introversion can be 
clarified by relating the single-continuum model to previous conceptualizations.  The 
components that make up introversion have been correlated and explored using many theoretical 
frameworks, and this chapter will demonstrate how all of them support the single autism-
introversion continuum model.  As introversion has a long and complicated history, the present 
focus will cover a defined timespan: this chapter begins with Galen’s description in 200 B.C. and 
ends with Jung’s definition and its legacy for modern construct explication. 
 
Introversion from Its First Extrojection 
 Introversion was introduced in ancient Greek psychological systems, attributable to 
Galen around 200 B.C. (McAdams, 2000).  With the beginning of the use of the terms, 
introversion and extraversion bore the heavy burden of terminological baggage.  Perceived 
correlates that were not theoretically or empirically linked immediately attached to these “types:” 
“cheerful,” “sanguine,” and “volatile,” “choleric” describe the positive emotions and impulsivity 
that would be carried over with later psychometric examination of extraversion (as in the NEO-
PI-R: Costa & McCrae, 1992).  Introverted individuals were those who were “stoic,” 
“phlegmatic,” and “depressive,” “melancholic” (McAdams, 2000).  The reserved or attenuated 
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 emotion, whether experienced or perceived, coupled with low energy levels and compromised 
mood would be carried over through the ages to be reformulated and ultimately refuted. 
 Immanuel Kant set forth a typology of the temperaments based upon an underlying 
motivational system.  The “melancholic” character remained tied to abstraction and remote 
consideration of principle, while the “choleric” character acts to maintain public appearances and 
regulated self-presentation (Kant, 1764 in Kant, 1764/1973).  While the former encompasses 
some aspects of what later came to be called introversion and the latter appears to define 
extraversion, the comparison is drawn more sharply with the inclusion of an impulsive type and a 
“phlegmatic” or conservative type.  These delineations appear to offer a new model, but the 
adjusted presentation actually maintains the content of the early introversion-extraversion 
distinctions.  According to these early conceptualizations, introversion marked social and 
emotional tendencies, characterized by withdrawal, depression, and an energy level lower than 
that shown by non-introverts. 
 
Freud: A psychological model of energy and inward fixation 
Early 20th century psychological models of the mind, most notably those described by 
Freud (1916) and Jung (1923), were based upon energetic systems.  Freud’s theory is renown for 
contrasting the dual forces of creative and destructive energy, but he also described the 
importance of proper direction of energy reserves: “A person falls ill of a neurosis if his ego has 
lost the capacity to allocate his libido in some way” (p. 480).  The investment or attachment of 
this energy and resultant inability for use in other tasks is described as “cathexis.”  This fixation 
can have an external or internal focus, the latter of which describes endocathexis.  Later theorists 
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 would describe a balanced system that utilizes introversion (endocathection-extraception) to 
allow for the “manipulation of external objects through speculative abstract thought or 
discussion; reflection and discussion about events or systems; data collection and inductive 
reasoning” (Singh, 2004, p. 235), or an unbalanced form that more closely resembles 
conceptualizations of “pure” introversion in that it lacks the dual component of “outside” 
reference (endocathection-intraception): “preoccupation with private experience, psychological, 
spiritual, esthetic, or metaphysical truth; introspection and deductive reasoning” (p. 236). 
Freudian developmental theory included a marked phase of introversion, or 
endocathection, at the beginning of life.  The continuation of introversion past these early stages 
was considered indicative of arrested development (Coan, 1994).  The infant is to be considered 
incapable of engaging in meaningful interaction with the world, even though there is an 
understanding of internal versus external phenomena: the infant is dependent upon external 
figures despite one's “natural autism” in these early stages (Mahler, 2003).  Though the infant is 
endocathected, one is completely dependent upon the mother to serve as an external superego.  
The ability to distinguish the self from the outside world can be seen in grasping behavior by 
which the infant seeks to draw something of the external world to the self. Infants may also 
comprehend essential differences between living and non-living objects in the environment.  
This differentiation is an interesting one, as “natural autism” does allow for the autistic ability to 
distinguish living from non-living objects, though the preference is for non-living objects 
(Fletcher-Watson et al., 2009).  The use of these external cues aids in the development of a sense 
of self and one’s interactions with the world as are critical byproducts of the development of the 
ego to temper the drives of the id.  “Persistent” and “intense” sensory input may be 
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 overwhelming, causing one to block out this outside world (Mahler, 2003).  In so doing, the 
individual’s sense of self and ability to form relationships with the external world are impaired.   
 
Jung: A foundation for modern conceptualization of introversion 
The synonymous nature of introversion and autism was lost by the development of the 
term “introversion” and the desire to create a neutral term.  Jung explained the individual’s 
manipulation of energy as extraversion or introversion.  By these two processes, one directs 
energy outward or inward, respectively.  Introversion and extraversion were placed on a 
continuum, with individual difference evident in a tendency to engage in certain amounts of 
introversion and extraversion to maintain one’s level of comfort and optimal function.  The 
original definition of introversion states that, 
“Interest does not move toward the object but withdraws from it into the subject.  
Everyone whose attitude is introverted thinks, feels, and acts in a way that clearly 
demonstrates that the subject is the prime motivating factor and that the object is of 
secondary importance.  Introversion may be intellectual or emotional, just as it can be 
characterized by sensation or intuition.  It is active when the subject voluntarily shuts 
himself off from the object, passive when he is unable to restore to the object the libido 
streaming back from it.  When introversion is habitual, we speak of an introverted type” 
(Jung, 1923, p. 453). 
 
While the concept of introversion is only a referent to one’s tendency to direct attention and 
energy inward with less stress placed upon environmental interaction, this basic definition comes 
with many implicitly related traits and tendencies, and it carries latent conflict and contradiction 
in its simple but obscure wording.  To begin, the “introvert” is described as one whose energy 
source is within, while the “extravert” finds his energy source without, in the external world and 
in relations to the object (though still focused on the object and not the subjective quality of the 
relationship as described phenomenologically), consistent, respectively, with one’s orientation.  
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 The basic direction of energy inward with one’s “inner world” as a font of energy dismisses the 
problem of directionality: for the introvert whose energy source is within and whose direction is 
“inside,” it is theoretically implausible for movement to occur.  Similarly, for one whose energy 
source is the outside world with energy focused outward, it is not possible for energy to never 
“come in” in order to be directed outward.  It would appear that the mere source/direction 
problem defies movement: the extravert never contains energy, and the introvert is an ever-filling 
well of energy despite the lasting conceptual linkages to diminished energetic feelings.  
Additionally, “inward” realms of thought versus “outward” realms of sociability, also to be 
considered subjective and objective areas, respectively, bring forth the invariable problem of 
such a separation, as it hedges upon Cartesian dualism and the suggestion that mind and body are 
separable, at least for conceptual consideration.  Another explanation for the tendencies that are 
exhibited through the appearance of social withdrawal, low energy, communicative difficulties, 
differences in thought and perception, and sometimes depression must be employed, rather than 
relying upon this shaky “energetic” foundational system that defies physics. 
 
A Jungian foundation for conceptual expansion of introversion 
The above definition is foundational to current views of introversion, but it leaves many 
questions for later operationalization; therefore, it also sets the foundation for confusion and 
ambiguity in construct explication.  Jung’s definition of introversion lends itself to interpretation 
that may include social anhedonia and hypersensitive narcissism, though later literature would 
also include self-reflection (e.g., Laney, 2002) and anxious self-preoccupation (Pontari & 
Schlenker, 2000), as well as shyness (e.g., Meares, 1958).  Interestingly, the above definition 
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 also hints toward the possibility of a lack of theory of mind: if one is preoccupied with one’s own 
subjective state and the primary focus is on the self, then the ability to understand others might 
be impaired, as the focus is not on the other.  Indeed, social ineptitude is often cited as a major 
source of social discomfort and preference for solitude (O’Reilly et al., 2004; Kavale & Mostert, 
2004).  These difficulties may manifest themselves in inability to understand others due to a 
preoccupation with the self.  This can manifest itself in a number of ways, dependent upon 
interpersonal style.  These will be discussed in greater depth under the subheadings of social and 
thinking introversion and theoretical applications. 
Jung’s definition renders other conclusions plausible, as well.  It may be expected that the 
introvert displays a lack of empathy despite intuitive proclivities.  While empathy was included 
in later conceptualizations of introversion (Aron & Aron, 1997; Laney, 2002), introversion 
should not be confused with the similar term “introjection,” a possibility that may have lent 
additional unintentional complexity to the term: while introjection refers to the “indrawing of the 
object into the subjective sphere of interest,” introversion is the turning of libidinal energy 
inward (Jung, 1923, p. 452). Later definitions that include empathy as a social/thinking aspect of 
introversion have assimilated this term into the “introversion” sphere of interest.  Also, the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Myers, 1962) is the intended operationalization of Jung’s 
dimensions of personality, but its conceptual definitions includes an explanation by Shapiro and 
Alexander (1975, in Porter & Roll, 1992) that “the introvert brings the world to him or her, 
whereas the extravert goes out to meet it” (p. 117).  The concept of introjection may allow the 
introvert to better understand the thoughts and feelings of another if one tries to experience what 
the other must be experiencing based upon the presumed experience of the other (Goldman, 
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 1989).  Introversion does not necessarily involve introjection, though, so it more closely 
resembles endocathection, or the fixation of libidinal energy on an inner point of focus with an 
inability to free the energy for use in interaction with the outside world.  Additionally, the 
inability of one to experience simulation would only hinder social engagements in which one 
actively attempts to simulate the experiences of another; however, social ineptitude itself has 
proven a controversial point.  While introversion-positive theorists (e.g., Laney, 2002) describe 
good social skills coupled with an unwillingness to exercise them, others (e.g., Argyle & Lu, 
1990 in Hills & Argyle, 2001) take a conservative approach in claiming that diminished social 
competence may account for such documented issues as depressed mood in introversion.  The 
early inclusion of disrupted sociability as a core trait of introversion has helped shape the 
development of later theories of the construct. 
Introversion may also be a presumptive correlate of hypersensitivity, as indicated by 
possible characterization “by sensation.”  This line of inquiry culminated in Aron and Aron’s 
work (1997) that describe “high sensory-processing sensitivity” as an introverted characteristic.  
This innate and hardwired sensory experience is at odds with the assertion that introversion can 
be a conscious effort to withdraw (“active” type), or an unwanted action that cannot be helped 
(“passive” type, which is more indicative of an underlying biological mechanism that supports 
this tendency).  While the latter delineation did not last through following literature, introversion 
has been acknowledged as a “preference” (Laney, 2002), even while its classification as one’s 
very nature that should not be expected to change or hide without discomfort was preserved 
(Laney, 2002).  As can be seen, the possible conflicts latent in the early definitions of 
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 introversion have been brought to empirical and theoretical fruition through later examination of 
these presumed directions. 
The confusion among the terms that qualify the construct of introversion was perhaps 
borne from its inception and simply maintained or augmented by iterations of conceptual and 
empirical work that hide the common thread of the very continuum on which it lies.  The early 
definitions and theoretical models described in this chapter introduce an ambiguous construct 
with many possibilities for further development.  However, these ambiguities and complexities 
find clarification when viewed through the single autism-introversion continuum model.  As 
early conceptualizations and their difficulties support this theory, the development of 
introversion in later research would build a picture that clarifies this relationship. 
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 CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION OF INTROVERSION SINCE JUNG 
The previous chapter focused mainly on how the introversion-autism continuum model is 
supported from the introduction of the term “introversion” through the development of Jung’s 
introversion-extraversion continuum model.  This view of introversion has provided the 
foundation for later conceptual and operational definitions as introversion-extraversion became a 
cardinal personality dimension.  It is this view that has greatly shaped our perspective.  However, 
its application has also prevented new perspectives that can elucidate the difficulties facing 
current conceptualizations and terminologies.  In this chapter, we will follow the development of 
introversion as a personality construct, beginning with Jung’s work as a springboard for 
consideration of the autism-introversion continuum model.  From here, we will use the clinical 
perspective to place introversion through its evolution to current conceptualizations. 
 
Shifting foci: Introversion beyond introspection 
Introversion and extraversion were formally correlated with a number of traits by which 
the processes came to be operationalized.  Jung’s “introverted” personality invests psychic 
energy in one’s own private thoughts, feelings, and fantasies.  These individuals tend to prefer 
solitary, quiet activities, and he operationalized this construct through the use of a hospitalized 
population of dysthymics to represent “introverts” (Freyd, 1924). By making this connection, 
emphasis on subjective states, mood, and a tendency to avoid large groups of people, 
overstimulating situations, and a plethora of novel experiences came to characterize introversion. 
 The qualities that came to be associated with introversion and extraversion were 
conceptual contingencies of the basic definition of the terms.  The distinction between “inner-
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 directed” versus “outer-directed” energetic focus defines the introversion-extraversion dimension 
as conceptualized by Jung (1923).  Extraverts focus on their environments and objects external to 
the self, thereby causing them to think more objectively.  Introverts, whose focus is upon the 
inner world, tend to favor subjective arguments, as these target their perceptions of their own 
reactions and feelings.  It is this perception of the outside world, not the outside world itself that 
creates the realm of thought for introverts.  Emphasizing different parts of the process, or the 
object versus one’s perception of the object, creates an interesting approach to all forms of 
experience. As models of introversion evolved, foci shifted: inner versus outer orientation 
became secondary to preference for focus in depth versus breadth.  Connections between 
introversion and dysthymia were lost, but new associations with social problems emerged when 
theorists shifted in focus from introspectiveness (Jung, 1923) to sociability (Eysenck, 1947).  
These changes reflect the gradual incorporation of the connotative suggestions in Jung’s model.  
Eysenck’s (1947) conceptualization of introversion described the opposite of extraversion, which 
he defined as the tendency to be outgoing, sociable, enthusiastic, and relatively impulsive.  
Clinical literature has shown the divisibility of sociability and impulsiveness, as schizophrenia 
and related disorders lack sociability (DSM-IV-TR) but have been tied to impulsiveness (Enticott 
et al., 2008).  Introversion proved to be a multifaceted personality construct, and theorists began 
to draw distinctions between types of introversion.  Guilford (1959) distinguished between 
thinking and social introversion, but he considered shyness to be a separate construct.  
Interestingly, he did not include social anxiety in the “social” component of introversion, though 
many later theorists would believe them to be synonymous (for conceptual example, Meares, 
1958; for operational example, Laney, 2002). 
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 If the “external” “social” world and “internal private world” (McAdams, 2000) are taken 
as opposite courses of energetic direction, then the conceptual link between sociability and 
personal experience, perception, and thought is inescapable.  Eysenck (1947) would add 
enthusiasm, impulsivity, and “heedlessness” to the definition, though energy level and “social 
dominance” would continue as important parts of the extraversion definition while impulsivity 
would become a mere correlate (e.g. Gray, 1987; McCrae & Costa, 1990).  The evolution of 
“introversion” was marked by iterations of streamlining and added complexity, partially based 
upon individual difference in the population of “individuals.” 
 
The emergence of the “Big Five” 
 Subsequent theorists worked with Jung’s framework to describe a facet of personality so 
basic that it became the first of the five dimensions of the Big Five personality inventory 
(McAdams, 2000; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) and one of the four facets of the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962).  However, some theoretical issues remain.  The Big Five’s 
extraversion subscale assesses positive emotions, sociability, and excitement-seeking, so its 
inverse, introversion, is not operationalized with an introspective, fantasy, or anxious component 
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991).  This definition does hint toward Jung’s conceptual and 
operational tie to dysthymia and mood disorder, social withdrawal, and limited scope and extent 
of activity, even though it lacks the essential component of “inner thought.”  Grimes (2008) 
explains that the direction of energy inward is not necessarily correlated with these personality 
traits, and that it is inaccurate to assume that the lack of introversion must indicate the presence 
of extraversion and vice versa.  Introversion and extraversion may be on two continua, 
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 commensurate with their status as independent processes that are not mutually exclusive.  In fact, 
one may be a “high-energy ambivert” or a low-energy individual, thereby detailing the effects of 
simultaneous high or low introversion and extraversion.  By this model, we may see different 
subsets of traits emerge based upon the interplay of introversion and extraversion.  Additionally, 
the type of introversion under consideration will greatly impact the emergent personality when 
subjected to certain environmental stimuli. 
 
Personality across cultures 
 The temporal evolution and expansion of the term introversion is complemented by its 
geographical popularization and generalization across cultures.  This helped refine how 
researchers view the term in various contexts.  Cross-cultural work complicates the picture of 
introversion further than the consideration of Western conceptualizations alone will allow: as 
noted by Takeo Doi (1985), the inner self and outward projection of the self are both 
interdependent and separable.  The way that one understands the self, the way that one wishes to 
be understood, and the means by which one attempts to relate based upon one’s understanding of 
the expectations and communicative mores of others and the society at large cause introversion 
and extraversion to expand into an interdependent system and, perhaps most aptly, a set of 
talents that requires manipulation for proper use in expression of the self within societal 
constraints and allowances, while proper self-understanding also occurs through this same filter.  
Therefore, introversion without object relations is not only impossible in practice, as allowed by 
Jung’s continuum model, but it is even impossible in theory because the two processes are 
necessarily interdependent.  We know the self through the object, and the object through the self. 
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Other variables: Motivation 
 Introverted type is dependent upon multiple factors, including motivational cues.  These 
vary across cultures, age groups, and other personal factors.  These are important to understand 
in order to accurately assess the dynamic that creates introversion and autism, and how similar 
these phenomena are.  Broadly, Jung’s original definition appears to be one of object-avoidance, 
not of moving toward the self.  This compulsion toward or aversion from a focal point becomes 
important in assessing introversion.  For instance, one may require withdrawal into one’s inner 
world for the purpose of meditative self-reflection or to ruminate (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), 
or one may be involved in a rich inner world (Aron & Aron, 1997), fantasy (Davis, 1983), or one 
may simply be overwhelmed and feel the need to avoid the overstimulating outside world (Aron 
& Aron, 1997).  According to Aron & Aron’s (1997) conceptualization, the motivation to 
withdrawal is twofold: one becomes overwhelmed by external stimuli and withdraws, but one 
also has a “rich, complex inner life.”  In this way, we can see the individual moving toward the 
inner world and/or away from the outer world.  While the objective result and qualitative 
behavioral reaction may be the same, there are marked differences in motivation, so the nature of 
the introversion and the constructs with which we can expect it to relate will vary greatly. 
 Unfortunately, terminological confusions have predominated from nearly a century of 
obfuscated discussion.  The words “introversion, low energy, and low sociability” are often used 
interchangeably, both in colloquial conversation (Rufus, 2003) and in empirical studies (Laney, 
2002; Grimes, 2005).  The most recent and prominent example of problems that emerge from the 
transition of theory to operationalization is evident in Laney’s (2002) conceptualization. 
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Laney’s definition of introversion 
 Laney’s foundational work, The Introvert Advantage: How to Thrive in an Extrovert 
World (2002) is intended to clarify the definition of introversion and to offer a psychometric 
measure to comprehensively test for the presence of the trait.  The actual definition remains 
somewhat elusive, as it is distinct from “withdrawn personality” and “shyness” (p. 19), but also 
included are rumination, general low energy with periods of overwhelming energy, inconsistent 
but recurring trouble with communication, confusion, anxious self-preoccupation, enjoyment of 
the company of others but disdain for social functions (including those that are informal), a sense 
of being overwhelmed at any acknowledgement of one’s own success (p.2).  The devotion to 
inner thought that typifies the “thinking” or “introspective” aspect of introversion would be 
undermined by mental confusion.  “Low energy” appears to be consistent with the dual continua 
model (Grimes, 2008), as this energy is not necessarily projected inward.  Additionally, the 
contradictory nature of oscillating energy levels appears most consistent with dysfunction that 
may otherwise be classified as “bipolar disorder” (DSM-IV-TR).  Conflicted feelings about the 
presence or absence of others and a lack of desire to share accomplishments, coupled with 
communication problems are symptomatic of autistic disorder (DSM-IV-TR).  This fluid, 
ambiguous, and contradictory picture appears to make most sense when understood through a 
clinical lens, even if the subjects under consideration are not clinical patients: rather, the 
constellation of traits and tendencies may be the non-clinical end of a spectrum whose extreme 
end has familiar clinical classifications. 
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  Introversion is distinctly defined as a temperament, however, and it is pointedly argued 
that it is not a pathology (Laney, 2002, p. 10).  Laney even argues of this population that, 
“…there is nothing wrong with them.  They are just introverted” (p. 10).  She attempts to frame 
the causal mechanism for these clinically familiar groupings of traits using another descriptive 
model: 
The strongest distinguishing characteristic of introverts is their energy source: Introverts 
draw energy from their internal world of ideas, emotions, and impressions… They can be 
easily overwhelmed by the external world, experiencing the uncomfortable feeling of ‘too 
much.’  This can feel like antsyness or torpor.  In either case, they need to limit their 
social interactions so they don’t get drained.  However, introverts need to balance their 
alone time with outside time, or they can lose other perspectives and connections.  
Introverted people who have the ability to balance their energy have perseverance and the 
ability to think independently, focus deeply, and work creatively (p.19). 
 
As such, one’s “natural niche” is where the individual is most comfortable on the extraversion-
introversion continuum, to use Jung’s (1923) single continuum model.  This allows for healthy 
fluctuation contingent upon environmental demands while favoring a certain expression of both 
traits in a unique combination.  While either introversion or extraversion is favored, the argument 
against clinical ties that relies upon “adaptability” is strained by the tendency to become 
“overwhelmed” due to an inability to exercise this flexibility. 
 Similarly, task-focus and other traits demonstrate different expression in introverts and 
extraverts according to Laney’s model.  For instance, introverts are seen as most comfortable 
working in great depth with narrow focus, and they become overwhelmed when they must work 
on multiple tasks (p. 20).  Her brief summary of traits for introversion includes fewer friends 
who are closer to the individual, a need for rest following even “enjoyable” “outside” activities, 
listening more than talking unless the subject is of particular interest, the appearance of an 
“observer” (and not an “actor”), taking time to think before speaking or acting, the experience of 
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 the mind “going blank” in situations involving groups of people or other sources of pressure, and 
an aversion to feeling “rushed” (pp. 29-30).  Interestingly, the subject pool for the development 
of this conceptualization was also reminiscent of Jung’s work: Laney’s own experiences and 
those of her clients may allow for subjective analysis and application, especially with a formative 
sample representing clinical phenomena that are not necessarily generalizable to non-clinical 
trends or those that are not based upon idiosyncratic personal experience.  Though the actual 
experience of her introversion and that of her clients may be well-documented, the data source 
might tell more about the construct than that which she has actually said: perhaps it is seen most 
clearly as it becomes more extreme, i.e., when the location of consideration is far enough down 
the continuum to be seen in its clinical manifestations. 
 Laney’s source and conceptualization depict a rigorous assessment of current views of 
introversion, despite the persistence of conceptual and operational flaws.  The model she outlines 
serves as the summation of popular and scientific views accepted today.  It also serves to form a 
critical foundation for a new line of thought: is introversion another temperament that has 
nothing to do with a clinical manifestation, as observed here, or is it synonymous or does it 
overlap with a preexisting (and formally-acknowledged) clinical condition?  Further, does it have 
any correlation to these preexisting conditions, as hinted by its conceptualization?  A view of 
introversion in depth and in breadth may offer more answers about the nature of the 
temperament, possible clinical correlates, implications, and new empirical possibilities. 
 The current view of introversion is the product of much conceptual and empirical work 
that underscores its importance as a personality dimension.  However, many questions remain 
unsolved from the time of Jung, and new questions accompany new presumptive correlates.  The 
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 autism-introversion continuum model appears to address some of these problems and to allow 
for greater coherence of the related factors.  However, as autism has been described using a 
factorial model, greater clarity requires extension of this theory to explore how factorial models 
of introversion support placement on the autism spectrum, as well. 
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 CHAPTER 4: A FACTOR APPROACH TO INTROVERSION 
The previous chapter concludes the evolution of introversion as a single-factor construct.  
As indicated by Carrigan (1960) and Hogan and Cheek (1983), for example, a single-factor 
model may not be sufficiently descriptive of the true meaning of introversion.  Grimes (2005) 
introduced four subtypes and used psychometric analysis to explore the factorial structure of 
introversion.  This chapter introduces the four-factor model of introversion to demonstrate its 
parallel to autism factors.  This will allow for greater exploration of the autism-introversion 
model, and it will begin to elucidate how these factors interact to produce the phenomena of 
autism and introversion. 
 
Laney’s introversion as a multifactorial construct 
As indicated in the previous chapter, Laney’s Introversion Scale appears to address 
multiple components ascribed to the dimension of introversion, though it was intended to be a 
unitary scale.  This operationalization may have been confounded by the multifactorial nature of 
the construct itself.  Grimes (2005) factor analyzed Laney’s Introversion Scale to discover the 
presence of two main subscales: one that contained items that showed high correlations with 
shyness (as measured using the Shyness Syndrome Inventory; Cheek & Melchior, 1985) and a 
factor that addresses social emotions.  The remaining 15 items did not correlate significantly 
with the rest of the scale.  It is possible that this is based upon an unclear conceptual foundation: 
the definition of introversion contains many contradictory statements and fluctuations in 
behaviors and attitudes.  Despite the assertion that introversion is not the same as shyness, eleven 
of Laney’s items appear to represent the construct well.  Perhaps the greatest flaw in her 
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 definition is its unitary nature: it appears that collections of traits may demonstrate the 
observable condition that we term “introversion,” but it must be considered by its components to 
be examined and understood.  As these components are conceptually separate, their presence or 
absence does not necessarily involve any implication for other possible correlates.  Perhaps there 
are individuals who demonstrate one type of introversion and not another, while both types have 
the observable result of a personality that appears withdrawn and quiet. 
The picture of introversion as clarified by a view that includes the proposed four subtypes 
demonstrates some notable similarities with autism spectrum disorders.  The nature of this 
disorder should also be considered relative the concurrent history of introversion.  A simple 
breakdown of the components supports their alignment on a single spectrum.  This section 
previews the overlap of the basic defining components, as the nature of these components, how 
they overlap, implications, and the dynamic in which they exist will be explored in greater detail 
later.  The current goal is to demonstrate more broadly the feasibility of the proposed approach. 
 
Defining components 
The first major areas of introversion-autism overlap include social and communicative 
aspects.  “The essential features of Autistic Disorder are the presence of markedly abnormal or 
impaired development in social interaction and communication and a markedly restricted 
repertoire of activity and interests” (DSM-IV-TR, p.70).  First, the abnormal or impaired social 
interactions can be seen in the tendency to become “frazzled,” “overwhelmed,” or “drained” 
after social interactions (Laney, 2002 and Aron & Aron, 1997).  For instance, Laney’s (2002) 
scale includes items such as, “I like people to come to my home, but I don’t like them to stay too 
 40 
 long,” and “I feel drained after social situations, even when I enjoy myself.”  A feeling of 
awkwardness characterizes Laney’s introvert’s social interactions, as undertones of intrusion are 
present: “I often dread returning phone calls,” “I don’t like to interrupt others; I don’t like to be 
interrupted,” and “I prefer to be introduced rather than to introduce others.”  The shyness 
component of the social/anxious factor demonstrates a level of social unease, possibly related to 
ineptitude in interaction, though causal direction is not indicated.  This is indicative of a subtype 
of introversion, however, as a “preference for solitude” (Burger, 1995) appears more closely 
related to social anhedonia than to ineptitude and anxiety.  Interestingly, these asocial trends 
adhere to the DSM-IV-TR’s qualification that individuals with Autistic Disorder have trouble 
initiating or sustaining a conversion.  Perhaps, as Laney suggests, doing so is “draining” because 
it requires additional effort to overcome the inherent difficulty of this activity if, indeed, autism 
and introversion overlap or share synonymy. 
Communicative impairment may underlie some components of communicative 
discomfort evident in Laney’s (2002) introversion scale.  Items include, “I sometimes rehearse 
things before speaking, occasionally writing notes for myself,” “I usually need to think before I 
respond or speak,” and “I talk slowly or have gaps in my words, especially if I am tired or if I am 
trying to speak and think at once.”  The tendency to have “gaps” in speech or for one’s mind to 
“go blank” when asked to respond in real-time interaction (Laney, 2002) represents the 
diminished communicative abilities that are common of autism and introversion.  The rate and 
rhythm of speech, as well as other aspects of prosody (including affect, intonation, etc.) are 
abnormal in autistic communication, and speech is restricted, both in development and 
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 production (DSM-IV-TR).  To “have gaps” in one’s words is a prosodic abnormality, whether 
included in the definition of introversion or autism. 
Also integral to the autism-introversion conceptualization is the commonality of an 
aversion to novelty and tendency to maintain narrow interests.  The restricted repertoire of 
activities and interests can be seen in correlations found between activity level and extraversion, 
with lower activity level correlating with measures of introversion (Grimes, 2005).  The relative 
depth versus breadth of interests varies with preference for depth, unifaceted focus, and narrow 
interests in introversion.  An unwillingness to be interrupted in activity and speech is common of 
autism and introversion.  Additionally, interruptions of work or an inability to finish, also 
characteristic of obsessive-compulsive disorder in its overlap with autism (DSM-IV-TR) is met in 
introversion with a discomfort in demonstrating one’s work to others before it is completed.  
Such behavior may also be categorized as a lack of spontaneous seeking to share interests and 
activities with others. 
The types of introversion and underlying motivation are important to understanding the 
construct itself, even if they should be individually tested.  Consider the aforementioned types of 
social introversion and thinking introversion.  According to Eysenck (1947), Freyd (1924) was 
the first psychologist to use sociability as a defining factor of the extraversion-introversion 
dimension.  He discussed the introvert’s tendency toward “…exaggeration of the thought 
processes in relation to directly observable social behavior, with an accompanying tendency to 
withdraw from social contacts” (p. 74).  This appears to agree with the predominant 
conceptualization of the introvert who has few friends who are very close, though this definition 
demonstrates a frightening omission of the closeness of those contacts: complete withdrawal in 
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 this sense typifies the onset of schizophrenia and schizotypy (DSM-IV-TR).  Social disinterest is 
also present in autism (DSM-IV-TR), and anhedonia appears to accompany depression, often with 
a social component (Rey et al., 2009).  This important clinical implication of social withdrawal 
as caused by social anhedonia, asocial and antisocial personality disorders, and other clinical 
symptomology may have prompted other psychologists to assume that compensatory social 
energy must be invested in the few friends that are kept: in this way, the same amount of social 
energy is present for both introverts and extraverts, but introverts favor depth of relationships 
while extraverts favor breadth.  Freyd’s model reflects a uniform and unchanging amount of 
energy, most of which is dedicated to thought in introversion.  This limits the energy invested in 
action and physical activity, and also in social pursuits, as consistent with later models that 
reflect low energy (NEO PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and low sociability (Aron & Aron, 
1997).  Freyd introduces an interesting perspective that the introvert’s level of energy invested in 
social pursuits does not allow for breadth of contacts, but it does not necessarily support depth of 
relating with few contacts if the energy is invested in internal thought, instead.  One’s ongoing 
and transient social needs will be met, but additional social energy is not necessarily present, 
though later theorists claim that depth of relationship replaces breadth and that social energy is 
constant (e.g., Laney, 2002). 
 The type of social investment interacts with other factors, as well.  Attachment style 
formation may impact one’s ability to invest socially in depth, in breadth, or at all. Nakashi-
Eisikovits and colleagues (2002) found that introversion, withdrawal, and internalization 
correlate with anxious/ambivalent attachment styles.  This energy may be invested elsewhere, 
much as the “workaholic” may compensate for an unfulfilling personal life.  Insecure attachment 
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 might cause one to be more inclined to invest in many others so no one social investment is as 
risky, or one might prefer a greater investment in a proven few with some conflicted ties to these 
few that result in a need to withdraw.  Yet, one’s social energy to be invested is not constant over 
time, as situational factors place the individual in flux.  Additionally, such dynamics also reflect 
interpersonal difference (e.g., Hill, 1987; Burger, 1995).  Freyd argues that energy is taken from 
all social processes to feed internal thought processes.  The nature of these thought processes 
may also impact one’s social presentation and ability to relate to others.  Freud (1918) introduced 
the concept of endocathexis to describe one whose energy is fixated on one’s inner world such 
that external investment is rendered impossible.  Therefore, the nature of this inward-directed 
energy, the inner object to which it is directed, and its goal are all said to be crucial to 
understanding introversion in its many manifestations. 
 
The utility of a factor approach 
 The underlying motivation that produces the dynamic observed as introversion or autism 
is fundamental to any conceptualization of these phenomena.  The facets outlined above 
demonstrate the necessity for component-by-component deconstruction, with preservation of the 
motivation and total dynamic of autism and introversion.  The type of inward focus contains 
multiple components which are most easily considered using basic categorization with 
subcategorization indicating valence, focus, motivation, etc.  Grimes (2005) introduces four 
“relatively distinct types of personality constructs” (p.13) or subtypes of introversion: social, 
thinking, anxious, and inhibited.  These factors of introversion are mirrored by a set of factors of 
autism, as the component approach is favored for both (Grimes, 2005; Begley & Springen, 
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 1996).  “…Different combinations of autism’s components produce the array of conditions 
known by the umbrella term autism” (Begley & Springen, 1996 p.70).  These introversion 
subtypes will serve, in the following chapters,  as a basic framework for component-by-
component comparison of autistic and introverted traits the various “idiosyncracies” that 
combine differentially to typify both conditions in an overlapping way with differentiation 
mainly in extent, and therefore partially in interactive expression. 
 The common defining trait set and the common dynamic thereby created is targeted by 
definition through a factor approach.  It is argued that overlap in both of these areas produces the 
most cogent support for the autism-introversion continuum model.  The expression of the 
subtypes of introversion are based upon differences in sensory experience, cognitive processes, 
and interactive tendencies.  High sensory processing sensitivity (Aron & Aron, 1997) causes 
sensory stimuli to be experienced and processes with increased sensitivity and perceived 
magnitude, often with an attention to detail as a result.  Similarly, anxiety is not an implicit part 
of introversion (e.g., Laney, 2002; Grimes, 2005).  However, anxious introversion addresses an 
absence of positive emotions and a presence of negative emotions, including both depression and 
anxiety, a sense of feeling misunderstood, hypersensitive narcissism, and self-doubt.  As these 
influence cognitive processes, emotionality and cognitive habits are another key component of 
the introversion-autism puzzle.  The final introversion component, inhibition, appears to describe 
conceptually a lack of extraversion, not introversion in the pure sense of “turning energy 
inward.”  Yet, as previously discussed, energy may be turned inward as a result of the continual 
direction of energy despite the inhibition from turning it outward, i.e., energy may be turned 
inward to avoid turning it outward.  Given these two possibilities, we see that “inhibited 
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 introversion” describes inhibition from partaking in an activity, either due to “running toward” 
an inward target or “running away” from an outward target.  The final option is that no running 
is occurring at all, and that energy is simply not channeled (Grimes, 2008). 
 Introversion became associated with “inhibition” due to its longstanding 
conceptualization as the inverse of extraversion, a temperament that is believed to encompass 
impulsivity (Eaves & Eysenck, 1975).  Hans Eysenck includes both sociability and impulsivity 
in his definition of extraversion, and this second factor is a combination of impulsivity and 
activity level, referring to a preference of high physical activity.  Grimes (2005) explored this 
aspect of “inhibited introversion” psychometrically using Buss and Plomin’s (1975) EASI 
Sensation-Seeking factor of impulsivity and activity.  This includes nuances of an openness 
component, both to novelty and to breadth of experience (ex: “I generally seek new and exciting 
experiences and sensations” and “I’ll try anything once.”).  The inverse of these scores would 
represent inhibited introversion, as negative correlations to measures of introversion were found.  
However, the fact that openness is included may limit propriety of application of this scale in the 
measurement of certain introverted features.  While the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) demonstrates many commonalities with measures of introversion, the 
operationalized tendency to avoid great breadth in activity preferences and the desire to avoid 
novelty appear to be preserved from the ASQ to inhibited introversion. 
 While autism appears to share some important features with inhibited introversion in that 
novelty is avoided and openness to experience is lacking, the preference of low activity for the 
purposes of fantasy and enjoying a “rich inner life” (Aron & Aron, 1997) are not necessarily 
shared.  Preference for activities that require little interaction with the environment (due to low 
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 energy levels) and with others (low sociability) is an important phenotypical indicator of 
introversion that is also an indicator of autistic behavior. 
Since the introduction of Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ (2001) ASQ, operational 
revisions have been suggested that cause its psychometric function to better support conceptual 
overlap with introversion.  Stewart and Austin (2009) found that deficits in “Socialness,” 
enhanced “Patterns/Attention to detail,” and diminished “Communication” skills provide the 
factorial framework for the most effective testing for autism spectrum traits.  It is also apparent 
that the qualities of introversion should include social components, attention to detail, and 
possible anxious components.  However, social introversion is also evident in schizotypal traits 
of social anhedonia and reclusiveness, anxiety, and creative thinking.  Still, inhibition is 
markedly absent from schizotypy and schizophenia diagnoses (DSM-IV-TR).  The interplay and 
possible overlap of autism spectrum, schizophrenia spectrum, and introversion traits will be 
explored in the following chapters using the four-factor model of introversion to provide the 
framework for this discussion. 
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 CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL INTROVERSION 
 In keeping with the factor model of introversion (Grimes, 2005), each of the four types of 
introversion will be considered as parts of the autism spectrum.  The social, thinking, anxious, 
and inhibited aspects of the introversion personality dimension are considered individually, with 
gradual integration to demonstrate the dynamic that creates the construct.  As these factors exist 
as distinct but dynamic and interactive, they are explored conceptually in this same way by 
layering them and defining them iteratively in interaction. 
 
Empirical foundation 
 This chapter examines social introversion using the autism-introversion continuum model 
as a theoretical foundation.  Social introversion refers to social aspects of introversion.  As 
previously explained, the introvert’s social preference is in depth of personal relationships over 
breadth, and in quieter social activities in lieu of overstimulating social environments.  The 
related traits and tendencies range from one’s desire for the company of others to one’s approach 
in relating to others.  Social introversion is based psychometrically in Grimes’s (2005) empirical 
study using the following measures: 
1) The inverse of Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-PI extraversion warmth and 
gregariousness subscales, which measure friendliness, warmth, sociability, cheerfulness, 
affection, and the tendency to be sociable, talkative, outgoing, and spontaneous. 
2) The preference for solitude scale (Burger, 1995), which indicates one’s enjoyment of 
time spent alone independent of socially aversive causal factors such as social anxiety. 
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 3) Low scores on the affiliation motivation (Hill, 1987) subscale of “positive 
stimulation,” which measures a positive emotional reaction to interpersonal closeness and 
communion, based on Murray’s (1938, in Hill, 1987) conceptualization of affliative need: “the 
tendency to receive gratification of harmonious relationships and from a sense of communion.”  
This also encompasses the feelings of love, intimacy, belongingness, and affection.   
 
Social ineptitude and a preference for solitude 
The individual described as above enjoys time spent alone and does not find oneself 
experiencing negative affect or emotions when engaging in solitary activities or when one is 
simply “left alone.”  Rather, the introvert is one who avoids large groups and social activities 
because doing so is easier and preferred to complex social engagements.  Similarly, autism is 
linked with a preference for solitude and difficulty in dealing with groups or other social 
situations (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  Solitary activities and individual interaction with objects 
are preferred in both introversion (from Freud, 1918 and Jung, 1923 through to modern 
conceptualizations as summarized by Laney, 2002) and autism spectrum disorders (DSM-IV-TR; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  Making new friends is difficult and undesirable (Rufus, 2003; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). Social awkwardness is another important indicator of social discomfort in 
autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and in introversion (Argyle & Lu, 1990 in Hills & Argyle, 
2001).  Therefore, the phenomena of social ineptitude, the preference for solitary activities and 
reduced interaction, and the dislike of social situations are common to autism and introversion. 
 
Placing social phenomena: Correlates 
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  As mentioned briefly, one possible reason for difficulty in understanding other people or 
feeling understood oneself (Laney, 2002) is an impaired ability to communicate effectively. 
Introverts often feel “misunderstood” (Laney, 2002), and they have long been found to be 
mysterious (Jung, 1923) and aloof (Costa & McCrae, 1992).  Introverts “speak slowly” or often 
have “gaps” in their words.  Additionally, their minds may “go blank” when asked to reply.  As 
such, communication is impaired, even as introversion-positive theorists seek to explain these 
difficulties as endearing “quirks” (Laney, 2002).  While introverts have a difficult time with 
reacting in the moment, communicating one’s thoughts in interaction despite ability to think of 
the words later, and maintaining proper prosodic flow to speech (Laney, 2002; Helgoe, 2008), 
autism has long been associated with communicative impairments that include abnormalities in 
affective content, prosody, and ability to maintain consistent speech.  Similarly, schizophrenia 
includes speech abnormalities that include affective and organizational deviation.  Laney (2002) 
states that introverts “may start talking in the middle of a thought, which can confuse others” (p. 
84).  While this may complicate matters for the introvert socially, it may also appear to manifest 
a disorganization of thought that leads to linguistic abnormalities that are not different from their 
expression in schizophrenia except for the degree of severity.  As autism and schizophrenia have 
significant overlap (DSM-IV-TR), the commonalities may shed light on the nature of the 
underlying predispositions and causal factors.  In all cases, a deviation from the norm can be a 
cause or product of social withdrawal, which is a core phenotypic indicator of all three standing 
classifications. 
 Some of the social difficulties result from one’s presentation.  Introverts “appear glazed, 
dazed, or zoned out when stressed, tired, or in groups” (Laney, 2002, p. 84).  The tendency to be 
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 overwhelmed and to withdraw as a result is common in autism and schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders (DSM-IV-TR).  Additionally, the apparent disregard for the thoughts and feelings of 
others links introversion and schizoid personality disorder (Rufus, 2003; DSM).  However, 
autism may be associated with deficiencies in oxytocin levels.  The chemical promotes social 
bonding, and Hollander (in Begley & Springen, 1996) has found that administration of oxytocin 
to autistic patients made them more talkative and “happy.”  Recent studies also show that autistic 
patients exhibit greater social interest and communicative interactivity with others when 
oxytocin is administered (Andari et al., 2010).  Thus, introversion may be linked to reduced 
oxytocin levels, but remediation may be possible through therapeutic administration of oxytocin.  
The association of depression and introversion may be partially attributable to an inability to feel 
“positive stimulation” from the interactions with others (Hill, 1987). 
 Autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders share a component referred to as 
“introvertive anhedonia” (Nettle, 2006).  This refers to an inability to feel pleasure from social 
interaction and a resultant tendency to avoid it.  Eysenck noted that the introvert tends to be 
“…fond of books rather than people…” (1975, in Hills & Argyle, 2001).  The ability to 
understand the clinical conditions may provide more information as to why introverts prefer 
solitude, as the displeasure when subjected to social situations shares a common description, 
even as its manifestation is less extreme.  Also involved is the introvert’s “courage” and 
“perspective” to “say unpopular things” (Laney, 2002, pp. 12-13).  The tendency to think 
differently from the group and to be comfortable disturbing the social order may be due to 
obliviousness of social nuances and mores, a lack of care about them, or an inability to perceive 
the impropriety upon initiation of the delivery of the information and normal adaptation online.  
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 It is, of course, also possible that this is an act of courage, though the tendency to try to avoid 
overstimulation would cause insensitivity to be a more plausible cause. 
 Social stimulation is effectively reduced by many habits of the introvert at the expense of 
understanding and connecting with the other.  For example, withdrawing allows for complete 
removal of stimulation.  Intermediate levels of stimulus attenuation occur with avoidance of eye 
contact.  While this is common in introversion (Laney, 2002; Helgoe, 2008), it is also common in 
autism, resulting in an outright fear of looking others in the eye (Begley & Springen, 1996; 
DSM-IV-TR).  The inability to read social situations is also evident in schizoid personality 
disorder (DSM-IV-TR), and the complexity of social situations, especially involving larger 
groups, causes such situations to be draining and difficult, especially for one whose difficulty in 
focusing attention causes the stimulus to be even more difficult to process (Allen & Courchesne, 
2001). 
 Introversion is often said to be mediated by the compensation of breadth of social 
contacts by depth of involvement with certain others (e.g., Laney, 2002).  However, findings 
indicate that there is no significant difference in reported closeness of friends between introverts 
and extraverts.  Additionally, extraverts are more likely to discuss personal concerns with close 
friends than are introverts (Hills & Argyle, 2001).  The ability to share such closeness with 
another is important to both populations, as “happy introverts” and “happy extraverts” share the 
same social behavior, even within a different scope of others.  The withdrawal of contacts 
altogether is indicative of early symptoms of pathology (DSM-IV-TR), and the allowance of very 
few very close contacts may signal a premorbid phase of paranoid schizophrenia (DSM-IV-TR; 
Karakula & Grzywa, 1999). 
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The introversion-positive movement 
 Despite the trouble with communication and apparent reduced social interest, some 
questions may remain regarding the actual similarity of autism and introversion by these 
parameters.  Perhaps the introversion-positive movement might be a source of doubt of the 
negative correlation of introversion and social competence (Hills & Argyle, 2001).  Further 
studies may elucidate the problem by using a psychometric study to empirically explore possible 
correlations between introversion, social competence, and happiness using an introverted and 
extraverted sample, grouped by introversion scale scores (e.g., Laney, 2002).  Bias may impact 
the current possibilities for finding a connection between introversion and social competence, 
even with communicative impairment as a necessary part of the definition of the construct and 
social withdrawal as a core component.  A high-functioning autistic (or Asperger’s disorder 
patient) comparative sample would show diminished social competence and lower subjective 
levels of happiness. 
 Other questions may merely be a matter of survey.  While some authors prefer to look at 
case studies instead of numbers to determine whether introverts or extraverts are more inclined to 
assume positions of leadership (e.g., Rufus, 2003), the picture of an introverted “leader” with a 
subservient extraverted “warrior” class (Aron & Aron, 1997) clashes with others’ perception of 
leadership skills as an inherent part of extraversion (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1990).  
Questionnaires may be developed to ask subjects about preferences in role assumption, but a 
survey of those in leadership positions may also lend better insight.  Additionally, such roles 
might benefit from necessary subdivision into tiers and types of leadership positions.  While 
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 some private leaders may live with less personal interaction, especially in the age of booming 
technology, others, especially politicians, require much interaction. 
 Other introversion facets may share a causal link with social introversion.  Social 
withdrawal could result from introverted thinking patterns and behaviors, or inhibition or anxiety 
may be the cause or effect of diminishment of social stimulation.  While the picture is likely 
more complex than a single directional model would allow, a cohesive understanding of the topic 
requires a basic framework of social introversion attributes with other accompanying traits that, 
collectively, depict a phenomenon much more like the autism spectrum trait set and less like a 
simple social preference.  One simple but fundamental example of this dynamic can be seen in 
the social manifestation of an aspect of thinking introversion. 
 
Applications of introverted ways of thinking to social and self-understanding 
 Thinking introversion must also include an ability to project the mind beyond its place of 
immediacy.  This has important ramifications for social interactions and interpersonal relating.  
The ways in which we understand others change our social selves.  Grimes (2005) grouped 
“fantasy,” as measured by Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index, with thinking 
introversion, but it may also be understood as a social component: this subscale measures 
empathy as the fantasized projection of the self into another’s situation.  This theory of mind 
technique, also known as simulation theory, involves trying to understand how another thinks by 
placing the self in the other’s situation; this technique has found support in studies of mirror 
neurons and apparent deficits in the mirror system in autism causing corresponding deficits in 
social cognition and theory of mind (Williams et al., 2001; 2004). 
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  The underlying assumption of simulation theory of mind is that the individual can 
distinguish the self from the other, and that one can recognize the other as “like me.”  As such, it 
is appropriate to equate one’s experience with that of another with only situational (and not 
confounding subjective) variance. Yet, the early preference for the mechanical in autism may 
also speak of one’s natural tendencies in that affiliation with these objects could stem from 
seeking those “like me” (Gallagher, 2005), or one could develop relationships based upon these 
interactions, which must follow rules that do not require a theory of mind.  The ability to develop 
primary and secondary intersubjectivity is impaired when interaction is insufficient (Gallagher, 
2004).  As such, current therapeutic models for social development in autism follow rule-based 
learning instead of employing interactive modes of understanding such that predictable rules 
allow offline consideration (Kavale & Mostert, 2004), as is typical in models of introversion, as 
well (Laney, 2002). 
The ability to understand others through various mechanisms of perspective-taking 
includes this empathic “simulation” of another’s experience.  An alternative approach, “theory 
theory” is an application of a folk psychological theory to understand the thoughts and feelings 
of others.  Southgate and Hamilton (2008) attribute social difficulties to a complex system of 
cognitive abnormalities in lieu of a “broken mirror” theory that explains social difficulties 
through impaired mirror neuron systems in autism and a resultant inability to “feel” what another 
feels.  Theory theory finds opposition in Gallagher (2004), as this offline processing does not 
seem to apply to most situations.  Instead, “interaction theory” describes our online interaction 
with another that is primarily reactive to the situation without much metacognitive investment in 
such offline manipulations.  In real life, it would appear that we understand others by attempting 
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 to simulate another’s experience far less often than we simply react with another and simply 
know how to interact online.  It is this interactivity that also shapes cognitive development 
(Gallagher, 2005), thereby rendering this theory of autistic social and cognitive development 
more comprehensive in accounting for the constellation of traits that are expressed, with 
impaired interpersonal understanding as a symptom in a much more complex matrix. 
It is well-documented in autism literature that autism-spectrum disorders render an 
individual incapable of such online assessments, and that training simulation or theory 
application may be a useful tool in teaching proper interaction.  Frith and Happé (1999) explain 
the utility of introspection for high-functioning autistics and individuals with Asperger’s 
syndrome, as it can be applied to learning and exercising an explicit theory of mind to 
compensate for the lack of an implicit social interactivity.  However, without recovery of an 
implicit theory, social understanding is likely to be compromised, as application of “implicit” 
folk theories has demonstrated accuracy comparable with “scientific” personality theory (Semin, 
Rosch, & Chassein, 1981).  Additionally, success is contingent upon effort to overcome inward 
orientation, the desire to withdraw from social stimulation, and a shift in attention to shuffle 
perspectives.  Ideally, the naturally self-centered perspective is exploited to understand the other. 
Whether this facet of thinking introversion can truly apply to social introversion relies 
upon a trait codependence indicative of a particular constellation of introversion.  However, one 
trait does not imply the presence of another by its own expression, nor can one trait account for 
the results of interaction among other traits.  For instance, Aron and Aron (1997) find only 
partial independence of high sensory-processing sensitivity from “social introversion” and 
emotionality.  The impact of patterns of sensitivity and the type of sensitivity, combined with its 
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 impact on perception and interaction create a complex and dynamic state.  The cognitive 
abnormalities that coexist with variation in perceptual experience may be associated with other 
aspects of introversion that may complicate the ability to fight the tendency toward inward-
focused, narrow investment. 
 More research is required to truly understand how introverted theory of mind functions.  
It may be based upon simulation of another’s experiences (e.g., Davis, 1983), or one may have to 
effortfully construct a theory of how others think.  Perhaps interpersonal relating is more difficult 
for introverts due to impairment of interactive theory of mind processes.  It is also possible that 
such impaired processes, coupled with the projection of such impairment onto other people may 
play a role in causing an introvert to feel misunderstood.  The nature of interpersonal 
understanding (or misunderstanding) may prove to be a fundamental part of the social aspect of 
introversion. 
 This chapter has offered operational and conceptual definitions of social introversion as a 
foundation for further explication of this facet of introversion using its placement on the autism-
introversion spectrum.  Observed behavioral similarities suggest similarities between social 
components of autism and introversion, and empirical findings that support theoretical causal 
factors are shown to be potential factors in both conditions.  As development of the autism-
introversion continuum model unfolds, these social factors will be shown in their dynamic with 
the other factors of thinking, anxious, and inhibited introversion. 
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 CHAPTER 6: THINKING INTROVERSION 
The autism-introversion continuum contains multiple traits that exist in an interdependent 
dynamic.  To follow the construction of this model past social components, this chapter 
introduces thinking introversion.  This facet can be further split by valence: positive or neutral 
thinking introversion and negative thinking introversion are associated with different patterns of 
thought and interact differently with other introversion factors.  This chapter is dedicated to the 
immediate focus of thought: basic self-directed thinking.  It identifies how the subjective inner 
focus described by Jung can be associated with negative thought patterns, and it outlines the 
trends, potential causal factors, and ramifications of these patterns as a function of introverted 
and autistic trends.  This is important to understand general thought patterns and previous ties to 
clinical conditions, such as dysthymia.  Negative thinking is also an important consideration for 
placement of introversion relative to its clinical autistic equivalent on the continuum, and to 
assess its dynamic with related anxious components, considered in chapter 7.  The dynamic 
created by introverted thought patterns, is related to social aspects of introversion and to the 
anxious and inhibited factors.  In this dynamic, the overall trends and greater dynamic of 
thinking introversion are elucidated by the proposed model of introversion and autism. 
 
Self-directed thinking 
Thinking introversion is based upon a cognitive component of introspectiveness (as in 
Guilford & Guilford, 1936), but it includes all aspects of thought, including topics of 
consideration, methods of contemplation, and valence, for example.  The inward focus of energy 
(Jung, 1923) is directed toward thought, with the self as both the observer and the attentional the 
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 focal point.  “Self-consciousness,” as addressed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss’s (1975) 
“private self-consciousness” refers to “attending to one’s inner thoughts and feelings” (p. 523).  
Understanding the self extends beyond the tendency to self-reflect to encompass who we believe 
we are.  This includes identity orientation, or how we come to define ourselves, conceptually and 
operationally (as through the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire; Cheek, 1989).  We may do so 
through our associations with others or through the groups in which we are members, and we 
may see ourselves as part of a community, using our perception of our interactions to understand 
ourselves. 
We may engage in other forms of self-understanding and –contemplation that do not 
capitalize on the tactic of understanding ourselves through understanding our place with others.  
A view that centers more on the self and less upon interaction may better fit an introvert whose 
orientation is inward to the self, not outward toward many or few others.  Dennett’s “intentional 
stance” can be applied to one’s own mind to understand the self and one’s beliefs and motives.  
He describes the intentional stance as follows: 
First you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; 
then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and 
its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same 
considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals 
in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and 
desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is 
what you predict the agent will do. 
(Dennett, 1989, p. 17) 
 
In this way, Dennett describes metacognitive self-reflection.  Other authors debate the propriety 
of this application of the intentional stance, as autism and the ability to understand others appears 
to present a special case, especially as the approach to understanding others is different from that 
which is applied to understanding one’s own intentionality (de Gelder & Tillburg, 1990).  Other 
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 forms of reflection may center instead on one’s interaction with the environment, or with 
contemplation of the environment and its affordances (Gibson, 1979), or possibilities for 
interaction with the self. 
A number of questions arise from this proposal.  Can the extravert truly be less aware of 
one’s own feelings about something or of one’s own metacognition?  Do introverts tend toward 
metacognition more than extraverts?  Perhaps Fodor (1975) may question if internal 
representations require more offline manipulation, consistent with his model of the mind as a 
computational machine that processes internal representations.  Does it necessarily follow that 
extraverts take an interactive approach with their environment, while internal manipulations are 
of interest to introverts?  Does the introvert’s mind work in a more computational fashion, while 
extraverts are more interactive and engage as situated, embedded, embodied agents?  If so, 
would it truly be descriptive to say that extraverts have a firmer grasp upon objective reality, 
while introverts are predisposed to the psychological illness implied by the schism between one’s 
perception of reality and the reality as it is?  These questions remain outstanding in the literature, 
as term confusion has precluded further contemplation of the ramifications of such a framework.  
Yet, perhaps Jung’s relation of introversion to dysthymia hints toward an unintentional but 
important point: that clinical implications should be considered for introversion, especially if the 
reason for the rift that divides perception and reality, and between the subjective world and the 
“real” outer world is related to one’s inner state.  Perhaps a retreat is necessary to preserve this 
inner understanding, or perhaps withdrawal is a symptom of disrupted patterns of relationship 
with the environment, others, and one’s own thoughts.  In either situation, introversion’s 
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 correlation with abnormal perceptions and psychological states may show a critical relationship 
with certain types of psychological illness. 
 
Introverted subjectivity 
Some of these concerns are addressed by the validity of the self-contemplation, or how 
representative it is of the reality of one’s interactive potential with the environment and with 
one’s own thoughts.  The valence of such contemplations is also important to this form of bias: 
Trapnell and Campbell (1999) distinguish between reflection and rumination.  These two modes 
of “private self-attentiveness” are aspects of “private self-consciousness” (Fenigstein, Scheier, & 
Buss, 1975), which refers to “consciousness of one’s inner feelings, thoughts, and physical 
sensations” (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, p. 284), as opposed to one’s thoughts regarding 
appearances to and impressions upon others.  These feelings of “public self-consciousness” will 
be considered in greater depth in relation to attentional mechanisms and anxiety. 
To delineate the nature of these private self-consciousness items by motivation and 
resultant approach, researchers operationalize “neurotic self-attentiveness,” or rumination, 
separately from “self-attentiveness,” or reflection (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, p. 287).  Some 
ambiguities still exist in this model, however.  First, the self-focus could be based upon 
assessment of performance, or thought about action, or it may be based upon the nature of the 
self, or thought about potential for action.  For example, thoughts regarding the nature of the 
inner self (as captured by reflection scale item 15, “I love exploring my inner self”) are different 
from consideration of one’s actions (item 18: “I love analyzing why I do things.”).  The abstract 
consideration of the self versus the concrete analysis of a particular action, especially as typified 
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 by ruminative thought, are qualitatively different.  Second, authors appear to focus on a self-
focused consideration, whether the point of interest of the observer is the self or the environment 
as it is perceived or understood.  Social items and interactive items do not appear to predominate 
these considerations.  Self-doubt may be a proactive process by which one considers failure 
before assessing outcome (imposed by the environment or circumstances) or social consequences 
(assessment imposed by others regardless of quantifiable outcome of action); self-doubt may also 
arise in retrospective assessment of perceived failure after assessing the outcomes.  In either 
case, the focus of reflective or ruminative thought may vary in a way that proves significant 
given neuroticism or comparison to clinical populations; thought content should be assessed as 
potentially different in degree between clinical or non-clinical populations, or the actual way in 
which one is neurotically self-focused may vary. 
 The outcomes of different patterns of thought reflect the variance in nature of self-
contemplation and of the self’s experience of the external environment.  These also speak to the 
implicit relational potential of the two, as one cannot understand the self as separated from the 
interactive dynamic of the environment, or disembodied (Gallagher, 2005).  As such, one’s 
ability to understand the self may lend greater clarity, though the “subjective” nature of these 
contemplations (Jung, 1923) does not necessarily account for alignment with reality or the reality 
that others may perceive.  Here, it is important to maintain the bond between private and public 
considerations of the self. 
 
Negative trends: Reflection/rumination, depression, and neuroticism 
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 In fact, the ability to pinpoint the placement of the negative reflection (the object, the self, 
or any part of relating with the object, whether external/circumstantial/object-based or 
internal/ability/self-based) may lend more information about the negative component of 
introversion, whether it is external and causes withdrawal (Aron & Aron, 1997) or internal and 
causes depression (Jung, 1923).  There may be an affective component to introversion beyond 
and possibly separate from feelings of being misunderstood or from a lower level of oxytocin.  In 
fact, the DSM-IV-TR links depression and autism when the individual has insight and can 
understand the nature of one’s affliction.  Whether this is cognitive and a product of feeling 
impaired if extreme or simply different if the traits are milder in their expression is unclear.  
“Dysthymia,” or at least mild depression may be related to lower energy level or other traits.  As 
autism and introversion are complicated in their causal mechanisms, the affective element and 
the directionality of its relationship with other features is unknown. 
Relationships between introversion and depression are not linear, either.  The “happy 
introvert” (Hills & Argyle, 2001; Wagele, 2006) may exist, while allowing for placement on the 
autism spectrum.  Eysenck (1959) explains that dysthymics are found to be most introverted 
when according to psychometrically with the Maudsley Personality Inventory, and that “…the 
regression line of [Neuroticism] on [Extraversion] is significantly bent at the extreme introverted 
end, showing a marked tendency, both in normal and in neurotic groups, for subjects with very 
low extraversion scores to have unduly high neuroticism scores” (p. 177).  This may account for 
later mixed results (e.g., Hills & Argyle, 2001), as extraversion was found to be correlated with 
happiness (e.g., DeNeve & Cooper, 1998 in Hills & Argyle, 2001) and predictive of positive 
affect (Costa, McCrae, & Norris, 1981).  Others have reported that “the main characteristic of the 
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 extravert is social activity, which can be a major source of happiness” (Argyle & Lu, 1990 in 
Hills & Argyle, 2001).  The main aspect of Asperger’s Syndrome and schizoid personality 
disorder is a dramatic reduction of social activity.  Depression is often comorbid, especially if the 
patient has any insight as to the nature of one’s condition (DSM-IV-TR).  While Jung attempted 
to make both extraversion and introversion neutral temperaments, it appears that introversion, 
with reduced social contact, may be predisposed to depression if it is extreme enough.  It may be 
that the expression of the introverted traits interact in such a way that depression occurs after a 
certain point, that social connection reaches a critical level, or perhaps that the clinical/non-
clinical delineation between introversion and autism or other related social disorders such as 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders occurs where depression and neuroticism increase dramatically 
on this correlative curve. 
 The descriptive potential of the curvilinear relationship of introversion and neuroticism is 
further complicated by exactly what it describes.  “Psychiatric patients who were traditionally 
diagnosed as neurotics tend to score very high on this dimension, but many individuals score 
high without having any psychiatric disorder: Neuroticism is a dimension of personality on 
which people vary only in degree” (McCrae & Costa, 1990, p. 41).  While this statement points 
out the potential for the general population to exhibit neurotic traits to a nonclinical extent, 
thereby allowing the possibility of further consideration of the placement of introversion on the 
complicated and intertwined autism and schizophrenic spectra, it also allows that the inclusion of 
these traits with introversion scores may not develop a cohesive and complete picture of the 
relationship of the two.  The ability to distinguish the effects of degree of exhibition of these 
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 traits, and not mere presence thereof, would advance understanding of the relationship between 
neuroticism and introversion.  This may require the development of better psychometric tools. 
 The actual definition of neuroticism may rest upon one of the cardinal differences 
between introversion and extraversion: favor of depth over breadth in introversion, and of the 
inverse in extraversion.  This may extend to the realm of behavior and related thought.  For 
instance, autism and obsessive-compulsive disorder have narrow thought-action frames, causing 
behavior and its motivational thought to be restricted.  Both conditions cause restricted behavior 
in response to a thought, and the inability to carry out the behavior causes one to become upset 
(DSM-IV-TR).  This bares great similarity to schizotypal symptoms in clinical and non-clinical 
populations (Tallis & Shafran, 1997; Roth & Baribeau, 2000) and to Aron and Aron’s (1997) 
highly sensitive person and Laney’s (2002) introvert.  These groups become upset when their 
routines, thresholds, or single-minded attentional foci become disrupted. 
 
Breadth, depth, and originality of thought 
Valence is a fundamental means of appraising thought content in introversion and autism, 
as arguments support an anxious, neurotic, or depressive aspect.  However, other patterns may 
also indicate the presence of the dynamic of traits that characterizes autism and introversion.  As 
described previously, depth is favored over breadth in many aspects of introversion and autism.  
Does a lack of breadth rule introverted thought patterns?  Grimes (2005) used the Big Five’s 
“Openness” trait to explore openness of thought, creativity, and breadth of curiosity.  While 
creativity and openness are related to detail and environmentally-focused aesthetic orientation 
(Aron & Aron, 1997) and artistic prowess in introversion and in autism and schizophrenia 
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 spectrum disorders (Nettle, 2006; Rawlings & Locarnini, 2008), narrow but deep and fixated 
orientation characterize these conditions.  Laney’s (2002) Introversion scale showed a very weak 
correlation with Openness (r = .02 for N=225 for the full scale), but her factors demonstrate a 
slightly greater negative correlation when taken independently (Shyness Factor: r = -.14, p<.05; 
Social Emotion Factor: r=-.02; in Grimes, 2005).  Laney conceptualizes the introvert as one 
whose interests are narrow, though these foci are considered in great depth.  As such, the 
operationalization may be out of line with the conceptual definition of the introvert: despite one’s 
presumably extensive realm of thought, the general trend of preference for depth over breadth 
appears to lend greater continuity to the character of the introvert, rather than drawing a 
description of one whose temperament is defined by limitation in extent but immersion in few 
areas, contrasted with one realm of expansive breadth at the sacrifice of depth.  In fact, thought 
and work patterns seem to support this, as attention-switching is compromised (Laney, 2002), 
even in thought (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).   
While Jung’s (1923) model details an introspective, contemplative individual, he does not 
limit the topical consideration as does Laney’s evolved (2002) model.  However, Laney’s 
introvert appears to share much in common with Aron & Aron’s (1997) “highly sensitive 
person” and Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ (2001) individual who bears autism-spectrum traits.  
Most pertinent to this particular introverted facet are the common tendency toward assumption of 
a narrow spectrum of interests and the tendency to indulge in in-depth pursuit until task 
completion with psychological disturbance resulting from an inability to do so. 
Our current analysis of imagination involves metacognition and primary sensory 
processing, but the ability to manipulate this information, especially to create an idea offline that 
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 does not currently exist is not yet represented.  Openness hints at creativity, but also important 
are fantasy and empathy, as captured empirically in the Grimes (2005) study by the use of 
Davis’s (1983) interpersonal reactivity index.  Of course, the type of fantasy might not be 
restricted to fantastical projection of the self into another person’s situation. 
The difficulty with operationalization of “fantasy” and the “inner world” in the Grimes 
(2005) study stems from the inability to measure the nature of these thoughts psychometrically.  
For instance, “fantasy” was primarily seen as a part of empathy, but fantasy may be oriented with 
or without the self as the main character, as simulation of the experiences of another is not the 
only way to enjoy a story.  Similarly, creativity is not represented comprehensively by narrative 
transportation, so following a fantasy that is mostly contrived by another to a degree dictated by 
the medium of presentation is not the same as the ability to build a fantasy in the creation of 
one’s own work, or even the use of imagination in varying types of daydreams.  Additionally, the 
frequency of daydreams is simple to quantify, but their nature would be difficult to record 
psychometrically. 
The creativity of the introvert may not rely upon detail-fixated aesthetic orientation (as in 
Aron & Aron, 1997), but may rest instead upon abnormal thought patterns and associations that 
are also connected with unusual perceptual experiences and as are present in autism and 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders.  Nettle (2006) finds that poets and artists have unusual 
experiences at a level comparable to schizophrenia patients and higher than controls.  However, 
they lack introvertive anhedonia and avolition present in the clinical groups.  The constellation of 
traits that manifest as introversion may show differentiation as described in autism by (Begley & 
Springen, 1996), and different weightings of components of introversion (as proposed by 
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 Grimes, 2005) may demonstrate differences in manifestation including creativity.  Nettle also 
suggests that different forms of creativity also require different ways of thinking, so 
schizophrenia and affective disorder show more similarity to artistic creativity in poetry and art, 
while mathematicians share thought patterns more closely with autism.  The former is said to 
utilize divergent thinking, while the latter employs convergent thinking.  These results are 
partially supported by Rawlings and Locarnini (2007), who found that positive schizotypy and 
hypomania appear to result in unusual word associations.  The extreme end of this continuum 
may be considered to be the schizophrenia disorganized thought and speech (DSM-IV-TR).  
However, weaker support was found for the association between autism spectrum disorders and 
creativity in the sciences.  The type of thinking introversion demonstrated, whether in line with 
postulates of expansive thought (Laney, 2002; Aron & Aron, 1997) or narrow but deep thought 
(as is evident be conceptual reanalysis of the same works as present in this paper) may be 
associated with different forms of creativity, if introversion and creativity truly are linked.  Other 
factors likely interact with abnormal sensory experiences and thought patterns to create the 
creative profile of the individual. 
Abnormal thought patterns are likely to exist in both autism and introversion.  Though 
such traits are often conceptually linked to schizophrenia, Ghaziuddin and colleagues (1995) 
describe “poor reality testing, perceptual distortions, and areas of cognitive slippage” (p. 311) 
associated with high functioning autism and even greater levels of disorganized thought in 
Asperger’s Syndrome patients, despite their lesser severity on the autism spectrum.  They were 
also typified as more “introversive” with more elaborate fantasies and greater focus on internal 
experience and perception.  Perhaps the nonlinear correlation with neuroticism and introversion 
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 might also relate to this complication in trait relationship: with greater severity might come 
greater limiting symptomology, as a greater degree of these traits might cause function to drop 
off when interaction causes the individual to be incapable of coping with environmental 
interaction in the same way.  Therefore, one’s “creative” ability might be trumped by 
irrepressible anxiety, or one’s fantasy might be undermined by decreased IQ, as is typical of 
lower-functioning (and more severe) autism.  It is also possible that higher sensory sensitivity 
might not allow one to retreat into one’s inner world as effectively, as withdrawal may simply be 
impossible with great enough sensitivity. 
 
The influence of “high sensory-processing sensitivity” 
 “High sensory-processing sensitivity” is operationally included in the Grimes (2005) 
study as a component of thinking introversion.  Aron and Aron (1997) describe high sensory-
processing sensitivity as a causal factor for overstimulation and a need to withdraw from external 
stimulation.  Individuals have a greater awareness of subtleties in the environment, piqued 
physical sensitivities, and aesthetic orientation.  The authors indicate that, “At several levels in 
the processing of input, introverts seem to be more attentive, discriminating, or reflective” (p. 
347).  While Laney’s introvert possesses many of these qualities, the overlap also appears to 
increase with Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ (2001) autistic traits. 
 
Attention 
 The well-documented introverted preference for depth over breadth may be a result of 
attentional mechanisms.  Introversion and autism are both characterized by narrow focus with 
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 difficulty changing tasks (e.g., Laney, 2002; DSM-IV-TR).  This may be a result of piqued 
sensitivity to stimuli and resultant detail-orientation (Aron & Aron, 1997; Laney, 2002; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001).  Similar patterns are found in autism: Allen and Courchesne (2001) describe 
“overly focused” attention in autism, and Lovaas and Koegel (1979) describe the problem of 
“stimulus overselectivity” as it causes individuals to be hyperattentive to certain stimuli and 
seemingly oblivious to others.  Allen and Courchesne postulate that abnormal attention may 
underlie other cognitive and social deficits, as they describe a pattern of selective deficits and 
abilities pertaining to selective, sustained, and shifting attention.  Sustained attention is superior 
in certain tasks, consistent with other findings that report comorbidity with obsessive-
compulsive tendencies (Hollander et al., 2009).  This may be due to cerebellar hypoplasia (as in 
Carper & Courchesne, 2000), or to limbic abnormalities, as the limbic system has many 
connections to the cerebellum (Kemper & Bauman, 1993).  These functions may also play into 
the tendency to become overwhelmed (DSM-IV-TR) that is also present in introversion (Laney, 
2002; Aron & Aron, 1997) or to prefer less stimulating activities (in Hills & Argyle, 2001; Aron 
& Aron, 1997; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985; Laney, 2002; Morris, 1979).  Cerebellar deficits are 
also linked to difficulty in changing attention (Allen & Courchesne, 2001).  These may relate to 
obsessive-compulsive tendencies and narrow interests in introverted (Laney, 2002), autistic 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and schizophrenic (Roth & Baribeau, 2000; Tallis & Shafran, 1997) 
traits in the general population whose expression of these constellations of these traits rests on 
the non-clinical part of these spectra. 
 The cerebellum might be implicated in introverted “depth” of attention, preference to 
work uninterrupted for long stretches of time, inability to present work until it has been 
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 completed, and dismay when interrupted or asked to shift foci quickly (for example, Aron & 
Aron, 1997; Laney, 2002).  The inability to assimilate quantities of information may also be 
related to such a deficit.  The cerebellum functions to prepare the neuronal circuits for optimal 
function in response to an anticipated stimulus.  This process is intended to maximize acquisition 
of sensory input.  Autistic subjects show diminished performance in quickly shifting and 
orienting attention, especially when one is already absorbed in another activity.  Attention was 
not found to be impaired when no switching was involved (Allen & Courchesne, 2001).  Authors 
conclude that the abnormal responses demonstrated when presented with social cues may result 
from a lack of preparation involving the limbic system, as well. 
Perhaps the limbic and cerebellar abnormalities can also account for the alexithymia and 
anhedonia found in autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders.  Allen and Courchesne point 
out that lower motivation from a lack of limbic system preparation for stimulus reception might 
show that social stimuli, as complex input, might be difficult to “sort out” (as described by 
Laney, 2002) due to an attentional problem.  The reported tendency to require additional time to 
think about something might trace its origin to difficulties in attention allocation. 
 Some theorists describe a tendency to use a lack of eye contact to diminish stimulation 
and to reduce distraction in conversation (e.g., Helgoe, 2008; Laney, 2002).  The communicative 
difficulties may be more drastic than attentional problems restricted to preference of one form of 
sensory input over the use of several, i.e., attention to all aspects of social content might be 
overwhelming, and eye contact and nonverbal decoding may exacerbate this effect.  While 
reduced attention to social qualities of the environment are typical of autism, Fletcher-Watson 
and colleagues (2009) found that superficial attentional preference for social information in the 
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 environment was shown in eye movements of adults with autism spectrum disorder.  However, 
social attention problems are evident upon closer examination with more sensitive measures.  It 
is the insensitivity to more subtle features of the social environment that the autistic individual 
continues to lack throughout the lifespan.  Direction of attention did not improve attention 
regulation and saccadic scanning preference for people over objects (Benson et al., 2009).  The 
recurring patterns of atypical strengths and weaknesses in perception and performance in autism 
is maintained as autistics outperformed controls on tasks of visual memory on non-agentive 
figures, while inferior performance was demonstrated for memory of agents (Blair et al., 2002).  
Therefore, attention, saccadic scanning, and visual memory preference appears to favor the 
preservation of solitary memory and focus in autism.  The nature of this attentional mechanism 
should be explored for similarity to introverted processes. 
Whether a withdrawal from overstimulation or unrelated attentional difficulties are to 
blame for visual social interaction and information-collection, or if some interplay is involved, 
verbal communication fails to support or compensate for these impairments.  Words themselves 
may contain too much content.  One quality may be favored at a time (Iarocci & McDonald, 
2006; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994), thereby also causing speech to lose its prosodic quality 
(including affective content) or meaningful content (stereotypic or restricted language) 
differentially.  While an autistic child may scream, thereby preserving the communicative value 
of the affective output, verbal use is clearly absent.  These phenomena may be tied to this hyper-
restricted attention that is related to social dysfunction, as onomatopoetic qualities of words and 
contextual meaning are a multifaceted means of conveying information. 
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  Other factors for attentional problems might include a problem in reduction of signal-to-
noise ratio.  As the cerebellum plays a key role in this process, the primary sensory abnormalities 
and patterned hypersensitivity of autism and introversion and subsequent sensations of feeling 
overwhelmed might result from a lack of reduction of “noise” because of a lack of attention 
modulation in anticipation of a stimulus.  The ability to filter the daily bombardment of 
information allows only salient stimuli to be processed, but hypersensitivity and the inability to 
filter out “noise” causes one to become” overwhelmed and incapable of efficient informational 
processing from sensory input (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999).  Stimuli may be 
overwhelmingly strong, causing the hypersensitive individual to be distracted from other stimuli 
(Bogdashina, 2003).  Similar problems are evident in studies involving the introduction of 
novelty.  Autism is associated with a preference for routine and an aversion to novelty (DSM-IV-
TR), but neuropsychological studies demonstrate abnormalities in stimulus modulation and 
integration (Kootz, Marinelli, & Cohen 1982; Ornitz, 1983).  Cascio and colleagues (2008) 
found that some sensations were enhanced in autism, while others were normal or attenuated.  
This may be due to attention to one stimulus at the sacrifice of attention to a competing 
concurrent stimulus (O’Neill & Jones, 1997).  
 The integration of sensory experiential factors and resultant processing styles leads to 
one’s sense of self by models that set forth a bottom-up approach to identity and private 
experience.  Singer (1984) describes a “private personality” model by which “…the basic 
systems through which information is initially received and stored [leads to] variations that 
ultimately shape the unique sense of a private personality.  The psychophysiological, affective, 
and cognitive systems are reviewed with reference to the kinds of input they provide.  These 
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 include variations in response to bodily cues… or in the styles of cognitive complexity” (p. 7).  
The sensory experience of the individual shapes one’s experience of the self and definition 
thereof.  As cognitive complexity is adjusted to account for focus on breadth or depth and 
sensitivity to bodily sensations is included in introversion literature, these factors also describe 
the embodiment of the self with which it interacts with the world, thereby shaping the experience 
and perceptual capabilities themselves.  This cycle accounts for attention modulation from both a 
top-down and bottom-up approach that interacts and iteratively shapes experience. 
 The attention appears to be directed inward in autism, much as in introversion, as Jung 
had defined it.  Kanner (1943) describes an autistic patient whose attention was endocathected: 
“He displayed an abstraction of mind which made him perfectly oblivious to everything about 
him… and to get his attention almost requires one to break down a mental barrier between his 
inner consciousness and the outside world” (p. 218).  This description could be aptly applied to 
the introvert whose inner orientation, different patterns of thought into which one appears to be 
well-invested, and a lack of desire to leave this realm of thought for social interaction mirrors 
autistic behavior well.  The presence of normal intelligence in an autistic sample, indicative of 
“high functioning autism” or a less severe manifestation of the other traits that constitute the 
classification of autism align with tendencies of introversion. 
 One may also retreat into this inner realm because one feels overstimulated.  The 
attentional shift may not be a passive preference, but an active avoidance of overwhelming 
stimulus input.  Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) postulate that “introverts should be better able to 
cope with extremely low levels of stimulation whereas at high levels of sensory stimulation it 
should be extraverts who are less adversely affected” (p. 249).  However, the implicit preference 
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 and the notation of optimal function in light of preference has also found that action is modified 
as a result of it, thereby giving introversion and sensory sensitivity a more prominent role in the 
way that individuals live.  Bullock & Gilliland (1993) explain that “the overaroused condition of 
introverts leads them to exhibit more restrained and inhibited behaviors and to seek social 
situations that are non-arousing in an effort to reduce external stimulation” (p. 113).  This is 
similar to the feeling of sensory overstimulation experienced in autism.  The patterns of thought 
that characterize introverted and autistic trends may have an attentional component and a 
primary sensory abnormality in modulation of input. 
 Primary processing sensitivity is not only higher in autism, but researchers have also 
found comparatively high sensitivity in introversion.  Aron and Aron’s (1997) model of high 
sensory-processing sensitivity in introverts and other theorists’ conjectures that lower stimulus 
thresholds exist in introversion than in extraversion (Eysenck, 1967) has found support in the 
work of Stelmack and Michaud-Achorn (1985).  They found greater N1-P2 amplitude in 
introverts than in extraverts listening to the first of four low-frequency tones.  While neither 
habituation nor attention is implicated for this result, it may cause attention to be channeled 
differently to adjust for this sensitivity. The aversion to novelty that might diminish one’s 
openness to new experiences may be due to this phenomenon and one’s desire to maintain one’s 
optimal range of stimulation. 
 Signal-to-noise ratios might be adjusted in autism, but the way in which stimuli are 
selected may disrupt normal interactive patterns.  Self-agency recognition is dependent upon 
sensory and proprioceptive feedback which may be disrupted in autism.  Blakemore and 
colleagues (1999) found that one’s own self-generated actions produce attenuated feedback, 
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 while the actions of others is experienced with greater intensity.  This may contribute to the 
desire to withdraw if the sensory input is great enough to be overwhelming.  One’s behavior is 
likely to be shaped by one’s sensory experience, and idiosyncratic patterns of sensory hypo- and 
hypersensitivity (O’Neill & Jones, 1997; Kern et al., 2006) are likely to cause patterns of 
withdrawal, impaired performance, and superior performance, which is documented in both 
introversion (Helgoe, 2008) and autism (e.g., Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994).  As sensory 
modulation is disrupted, abnormal processing and reaction are likely to result (Ornitz, 1983).  As 
the introvert and the autistic individual are both differentially affected by sensory 
overstimulation and narrowness of attention to perceptual information, these findings may shed 
some light on behavior of both groups to varying degrees, especially as a potential causal factor 
for social reclusion. 
 The abnormal sensory experience can lead the individual to be detail-oriented, a 
phenomenon linked to both autism and introversion, but such attention to detail may lead the 
individual to filter out other information, especially that which may be salient in a social 
situation (Klin et al., 2003).  Bogdashina (2003) details the impact of sensory hypersensitivity 
using Temple Grandin’s story as a prominent example.  Stimuli can be so intense that they are 
“painful,” or they may cause one to feel “overloaded by too much sound; visual stimulation; 
emotional or/and physical demand and environmental expectation” (p. 11).  For the introvert, 
whose characteristic low energy level, desire to “recharge” in quiet solitary activity, and whose 
sense of being easily overwhelmed by “too much” sensory input and affective deviations from 
non-introverted trends, this explanation appears to summarize one’s experience.  While Aron and 
Aron (1997) assert that extraverts can also have high sensory-processing sensitivity, introverts 
 76 
 work to diminish activity, social stimulation, breadth of pursuits, exposure to deadlines, and 
excitement-seeking.  These tendencies are more in line with introversion, justifying the overlap 
of high sensory-processing sensitivity and autism, while also describing the trends to maintain 
“optimal stimulation” (Eysenck, 1967).  As social and emotional overstimulation are described 
as problematic for the autistic individual, the reclusive introvert may share such feelings that 
manifest in negative social emotions leading to withdrawal (Grimes, 2005). 
 The problem of sociability in autism and introversion is also complicated by the 
complexity of social interaction, and it may also be linked to difficulties in assuming broader 
attentional foci.  Temple Grandin (2008) describes the greater ease with which autistic 
individuals can communicate with pictures and music, as verbal communications are 
uncomfortably direct and involve more sensory modalities.  As such, one may find that impaired 
communicative ability may stifle sociability and make it more difficult for both groups. 
The inability to shift attention may also manifest itself in self-other attention, thereby 
causing difficulty in collection and processing of social input.  Frith and DeVignemont (2005) 
explain that difficulty may arise in switching between an egocentric and allocentric perspective.  
If “narrowness” of sensory input characterizes introverted thought and private self-
consciousness, and sensory hypersensitivity contributes as an important part of an introverted 
perspective, the withdrawal from social interaction may be the behavioral manifestation of a self-
focus due to an inability to assume an external focus with attention centered on strong internal 
stimuli and overwhelming sensory experience replacing breadth of interest. 
 These thought patterns begin with self-directed subjective perspectives as described by 
Jung (1923), radiating to perspectives of the environment.  To build upon introverted thinking as 
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 “self-directed” or “inward-directed” thought, a more comprehensive and descriptive view must 
include ways of thinking that are significantly mediated by inner conditions (e.g., attentional 
preference and capacity).  The preceding section provides a description of the lens through which 
the introvert experiences events and situations and processes one’s experiences.  The following 
section sets thinking introversion as described in this way in motion so it can be seen as a 
dynamic, interdependent with other features of introversion.   
Thinking and social introversion factors interact with sensory perception and other 
factors to produce the introverted experience.  The nature of this experience is further elucidated 
by comparison to the clinical factors of autism and the relationship of autistic factors to explain 
interactive effects.  However, autism and introversion are the products of a combination of 
factors that appear to be common but vary in severity along the continuum.  These components 
may be present to varying degrees along the continuum, which is an assessment only of overall 
function: differences in component weightings is possible along the continuum in both autism 
and introversion.  This additional dimension to the autism-introversion continuum model 
becomes evident with variance in the valence and type of thinking that takes place, as described 
in this chapter.  The differential factor weighting along the continuum is a product of interaction 
of various components with each other and with the environment.  This will become clearer in 
the next chapter, which explores the third introversion facet: anxious introversion.  
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 CHAPTER 7: ANXIOUS INTROVERSION 
The previous chapter focused on thinking introversion and its relationship to social 
introversion using the autism-introversion continuum model as a theoretical framework.  This 
chapter introduces anxious introversion, a factor that may be present to varying degrees and with 
variance in expression.  The origins of anxious introversion may have social or thinking roots, 
and they may also impact these facets.  The origins, nature, outcome, and dynamic of anxious 
introversion are explored in this chapter. 
The anxiety-provoking component of introversion may result from sensory 
hypersensitivity and an inability to attenuate and sort stimuli, though other sources may be 
rooted in social origins.  Attentional mechanisms that help modulate emotional states may be 
impaired, preventing the perception of emotional content, as is true in depression (Bermpohl et 
al., 2009).  Though depression has been correlated with introversion and autism, it is not the sole 
connection to abnormalities in emotional regulation: Schrader (1997) found that anhedonia may 
have trait-like properties.  As such, it is unchanged by fluctuations in depression severity.  While 
attention problems may impair proper stimulus processing for comprehension of emotional and 
social content, an underlying problem in emotional regulation and comprehension (alexithymia) 
and attenuation (anhedonia) may worsen the ability to focus on salient cues and then to process 
these stimuli for proper relating with others. 
 
Social anhedonia and alexithymia 
Social anhedonia leads to a greater predisposition to depression and anxiety.  Rey and 
colleagues (2009) found correlations among schizotypy, anhedonia, depression and anxiety, 
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 indicating an interrelatedness of these groups of symptoms.  This supports the work of Chapman 
and colleagues (1976), who also cite Rado’s view that anhedonia prevents “zest for life, impairs 
the ability to relate to other people, and weakens the feelings of joy, affection, love, pride, and 
self-respect” (p. 374).  It is unclear if blunted affect is the result of overcompensation in response 
to overstimulation.  However, many aspects of introversion, especially interactive development 
of a sense of self and understanding of the environment, lower level of energy and activity, and a 
lack of experience of positive stimulation and affiliation motivation are impacted by a lack of joy 
and proper reinforcement of behavior from these stimuli.  Deficits in awareness of one’s own 
emotions as is present in schizophrenia (Baslet et al., 2009) and autism (Silani et al., 2008) may 
contribute to differences in attentional focus and patterns of thinking, and it may also relate to 
social withdrawal, a lack of understanding of others, and depressive tendencies.  Baslet and 
colleagues (2009) found that higher levels of emotional awareness correlated with better quality 
of life and lower levels of anhedonia.  Schizophrenia spectrum disorders were associated with 
impairment in anticipation of others’ emotional responses in social situations, and disruption in 
integration for emotional processing is indicated.  Silani and colleagues (2008) found that 
empathy was also reduced with alexithymia, thus indicating that the inability to understand one’s 
own emotions is linked to understanding the emotions of others.  Impairments in self-reflection 
and mentalizing were not related, thereby supporting earlier conclusions involving fantasy and 
theory of mind.  However, the ability to understand oneself and others may lead to social deficits 
without the necessary involvement of thinking introversion. 
 
Social deficits 
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 The inability to understand others, to regulate how one may be seen by others, or the 
ability to comprehend how others may see oneself may increase anxiety in introversion and 
autism, and also in schizophrenia spectrum disorders.  A lack of understanding of others can lead 
to an inability to develop an adaptive public self-consciousness (as described by Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975).  An apparent lack of concern for how one is perceived by others (Rufus, 
2003) has been tied to very painful feelings, especially about social situations (DSM-IV-TR), as is 
true of schizoid personality disorder.  This may cause the individual to withdraw socially, despite 
any potential desire for social interaction and indulgence of one’s affliative need.  The sense of 
feeling “misunderstood” may cause negative affect, as previously asserted, and it may cause one 
to have social misgivings that feed negative social emotions. 
 When one cannot read the intentions and thoughts of another and finds oneself 
misunderstanding others, this can result in problems with how one believes others see the self 
and in how one interprets the thoughts, feels, and motives of others.  In schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders, this is tied to social reclusiveness, a lack of trust (except, in many cases, of certain 
immediate family members), suspiciousness, excessive social anxiety, and ideas of reference 
(DSM-IV-TR; Raine, 1991).  Similarly, introversion shows strong correlations with shyness and 
relatively strong correlations with hypersensitive narcissism, with strong inverse correlations 
with positive emotions and assertiveness (both are subscales of the NEO-PI Extraversion facet) 
(Grimes, 2005).  Hypersensitive narcissism causes one to feel vulnerable and to experience 
hypersensitivity (Hendin & Cheek, 1997).   The inward self-focus manifests itself in “grandiose 
self-relevant fantasies” and a sense of entitlement (p. 589), insecurity, and “negative 
emotionality” (p. 597).  The negative emotionality and self-preoccupation, sensitivity to 
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 rejection, and strong correlation to neuroticism mirror the self-aggrandizing delusions and 
paranoid feelings that, in this more extreme form, may be present in schizophrenia. 
 The problem of a detachment from social reality may exacerbate the problem in an 
iterative fashion.  Interpersonal sensitivity is important to the development of positive affect, and 
it has also been found to correlate positively with more favorable and adaptive psychosocial 
functioning (Hall et al., 2009).  It is possible that impaired functioning increases dysfunction 
(Bogdashina, 2003), but it is also possible that social introversion may be a commonality among 
mental illness with degree of interpersonal sensitivity as the primary cause, effect, or both.  Other 
constellations of traits may manifest as social dysfunction, as differences in perceptual or 
cognitive function could be exhibited in the ability or inability to interact with others whose 
perceptual and cognitive mechanisms constitute the norm.  While this does not mean that social 
introversion is necessarily indicative of dysfunction, the withdrawal from others who do not 
relate to or support one’s cognitive or behavioral style is plausible.  However, other traits and 
underlying motivations may render thinking introversion the cause of social reclusion, just as 
social anhedonia may cause reclusiveness.  The link between introversion and autism therefore 
shares a much more important and comprehensive overlap than the social manifestation, though 
the affective component may be related to the social component in both conditions.  Perhaps the 
anxiety present in both anxious introversion and autism spectrum disorders is partially due to 
social dysfunction, but the picture appears more complicated than such a hypothesis would 
allow.  Just as impaired social function might exacerbate dysfunction, so dysfunction may impair 
social function in a similar way.  In schizophrenia spectrum disorders, autism spectrum 
disorders, and introversion, individuals tend to trust only those who are especially close to the 
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 self, including old friends and family members; they tend to avoid and distrust all others, 
deriving either anxiety or a lack of pleasure from encounters with others. 
These problems are likely to extend to communication, as French and Schuldberg (1994) 
studied the accuracy and expressive content of emotional communication.  They found that 
anhedonia showed a strong correlation with less emotional expressiveness in real-life social 
situations, though laboratory communication and self-monitoring did not differ from norms.  
These emotional deviations appear to underlie proper social understanding, theory of mind, and 
understanding of the self.  Anxiety and anhedonia or alexithymia could therefore be considered a 
subcomponent of social introversion as much as social aspects may be included under anxious 
categorization. 
 Emotional dysregulation and abnormal cognitive patterns can create difficulty in 
understanding the self and others.  If Dennett’s intentional stance is applied to the self to 
understand the self as it can be applied to others, then an inability to understand the self would 
pervade applications to other minds, as well.  Carruthers (2009) defends the perspective that our 
knowledge of our own attitudes comes from self-mindreading.  While this may require some 
level of unconscious and instant self-interpretation, he argues that schizophrenia is a dissociation 
of metacognition and mindreading, and that autism is the inverse.  The level of overlap between 
the two disorders (DSM-IV-TR) does not indicate such vastly different problems with 
understanding other minds, especially when considering difficulties in recognition of affect.  The 
inability to shift focus to the mind of another, to leave one’s “inner world” for interaction, or to 
have great difficulty in reading emotion in others due to the inability to understand emotion 
through one’s own experience seems to link introversion, autism and schizophrenia. 
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The placement of anxious introversion in the conceptual framework: An integration of 
anxious components and ties to other facets 
 Perhaps the greatest utility of the conceptual mapping of autism and introversion onto the 
same spectrum rests in its ability to elucidate the problem of anxious introversion.  If 
introversion is a neutral term as Jung had intended, or if it is desirable as others have argued 
(e.g., Aron & Aron, 1997; Laney, 2002; Helgoe, 2008), it should follow that anxious introversion 
does not exist.  Yet measures of introversion appear to show their strongest correlations to 
measures that include an anxious component (Grimes, 2005).  For instance, the “positive 
emotion” subscale of the NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), might demonstrate a relationship 
that is more complex and significant than a correlation with social withdrawal alone would 
allow.  The lack of positive emotions could also be related to anhedonia, with causal direction 
unknown.  The reason for such strong introversion-anxiety correlations may be that the nature of 
introversion also overlaps with autism and related disorders in this way, too, with anxious 
components expressed to a degree indicative of the location on the autism spectrum: if 
introversion is not clinical “autism,” then anxious markers may be less severe. 
 Other anxious components complicate the introversion and autism dynamics.  Autism and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder have been shown to overlap with each other and with generalized 
anxiety disorder (Cath, 2008).  This may include a need for control and for an anxious reaction 
when one perceives a lack of control, especially in social situations (Blackshaw et al., 2001).  
The frequency of development of anxiety disorders is higher in autistic children than in those 
who do not have a developmental disorder (Kimel, 2009).  Therefore, anxiety, especially related 
 84 
 to control, a lack of mastery of theory of mind, and systemizing tendencies have been tied to 
autism.  Introversion may be caused by a turning inward to discover a sphere of control when 
none can be discerned in the external world.  Perhaps an avoidance of the external world may 
motivate such a preference.  If no other bastion of control is conceded by introversion literature 
as of yet, current theories support the retreat into the internal world to regulate sensory 
stimulation as one withdraws to avoid overstimulation (Bogdashina, 2003; Laney, 2002; Aron & 
Aron, 1997).  However, such possibilities are set forth by clinical literature.  Problems with 
emotional understanding and regulation are related to attribution of control.  Loas and colleagues 
(1998) found that an external locus of control was tied to alexithymia and anhedonia with 
depression.  As such neurotic components are also present in introversion but without 
explanation, we may have to turn to the extreme end of the spectrum to understand the 
relationship of these variables as they interact in the introverted mind. 
 Research has uncovered ties among sensory processing sensitivity, alexithymia, autism, 
depression, and anxiety.  Cheek and colleagues (2009) found separate factors of Aron and Aron’s 
(1997) Highly Sensitive Person Scale into physical sensitivity/sensory overstimulation, which 
show some possible overlap when factor analyzed, and an aesthetic component that does not 
overlap with the other factors.  Grimes (2005) found high correlations between the 
“overwhelm/frazzle” component and Laney’s (2002) introversion measure (r=.55, p<.01; N = 
225) but weak correlations between aesthetic orientation and introversion (r = .15, p<.05; N = 
225).  These findings are corroborated by the work of Liss and colleagues (2008), who 
discovered ease of excitation and low sensory threshold were related to autism symptoms, 
alexithymia, anxiety, and depression, but aesthetic sensitivity was related to the autistic attention 
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 to detail and anxiety, but not to depression; a component of alexithymia was negatively 
correlated with aesthetic sensitivity.  Researchers conclude that higher ease of excitation and 
inability to identify feelings causes an increase in anxiety. 
 The experience of novelty has been approached from a “stimulus hypersensitivity” or 
“overstimulation” perspective with evidence that a lack of attenuation causes novel stimuli to be 
of greater magnitude when perceived by introverts than extraverts.  However, Corbett and 
colleagues (2006) noted abnormally high cortisol levels with experience of novelty in autistic 
populations.  Kootz and colleagues (1982) note that  “…blood pressure, heart rate, peripheral 
blood flow…and peripheral vascular resistance…[show] patterns consistent with rejection of 
external sensory information” (p. 185) and “…greater response disruption and an increased heart 
rate, consistent with their behavioral need to preserve sameness…” (p. 185) in autism.  These 
physiological reactions to novelty may be found to exist to a lesser extent in introversion, thereby 
accounting for a desire to reduce stimulation through avoidance of sensation-seeking and 
exciting activities. 
 Other introverted preferences may be viewed as temperamental idiosyncracies, but they 
may show an underlying connection with a maladaptive condition in autism.  Rufus (2003) 
describes the introvert’s desire to sleep through the afternoon and to be active during the night.  
Corbett and colleagues (2008) found evidence that connects sensory sensitivity, cortisol levels, 
and stress in autism, and Hu and colleagues (2009) found circadian rhythm dysfunction in autism 
tied to a genetic variant.  Autistic groups also showed circadian dysregulation and increased 
cortisol in anticipation of re-exposure to novel stimuli, which were perceived as stressors 
(Corbett et al., 2008).  Increased levels of cortisol are generally found in the morning with 
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 decreasing levels during the day, while chronic stress patients often increase during the day.  
This may account for the findings that impact circadian rhythm, as well, as autistic individuals 
are predisposed to anxiety disorders.  Problems of distraction and overstimulation during the day 
with difficulties in modulating attention may account for the introvert’s preference for the 
reduced stimulation, interactivity, and expected activity that would be experienced at night.  
Such a preference would be expected to extend to autistic groups, as well (Bogdashina, 2003), as 
decreased stimulation would be optimal for introverts and autistic individuals alike.  Whether 
preference or stress and neurological stimulation lead to such disruption is unclear.  However, 
Killgore and colleagues (2007) also showed extraverts appear to show greater resistance than do 
introverts to the adverse effects of decreased vigilance and attention when deprived of sleep.  
The problems of circadian rhythm dysregulation do not resolve in resultant adaptability, nor does 
superior function cause the disruption.  However, it might contribute to other areas of possible 
underperformance, especially as can be seen in areas of deficit in autism and negative symptoms 
of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. 
 Social, thinking, and anxious introversion reflect autistic trends as factors considered 
independently, and their dynamic shows similarity to that of autism spectrum disorders, as well.  
The confusion surrounding the negative aspects of anxiety, depression, stress, and 
overstimulation, for example, may be dissipated as they are placed conceptually as cohesive 
parts of the introverted picture.  The construct of introversion becomes clearer as the dynamic 
that creates the personality dimension becomes more conceptually viable.  Additionally, this 
theoretical model opens new possibilities for empirical exploration of facets of anxiety in both 
autism and introversion, and perhaps new methods of remediation to alleviate the anxious factor. 
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 CHAPTER 8: INHIBITED INTROVERSION 
 Anxious components may be closely related to the introverted factor of inhibition.  
Anxiety can cause inhibition directly, or the factors that may cause or result from the anxiety 
(e.g., anhedonia) may correlate with inhibition. However, inhibition can also be considered a 
function of sensory experience, physical limitations, or tendencies to promote optimal function.  
Introverts have a lower threshold for external stimuli and tend to become overwhelmed when 
they are overstimulated by sensory or emotional stimuli.  They seek to maintain their optimal 
level of arousal so they can prevent overstimulation and the sense of becoming overwhelmed.  
Additionally, that which appears to be inhibition may be a mere appearance of holding back 
when one is actually unmotivated to act at all.  The concept of vitality provides an alternative 
explanation for seeming inhibition and it describes that which is inhibited.  Gray’s model of the 
behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation systems offers more support for viability of this 
facet and its proposed extreme expression as an autistic trait.  The interplay of thinking 
introversion with these biological factors demonstrates the dynamic of this introversion facet.  
The goal of this chapter is to explore the underlying causes and relationships of variables related 
to inhibited introversion and how these relate to other factors of introversion. 
 
Anhedonia, alexithymia, and the inhibited facet of introversion 
Optimal arousal 
 Emotional dysregulation or attenuation may also motivate sensation-seeking experiences.  
Anhedonia shows a partial relationship with sensation-seeking in some, and researchers believe 
that correlations show compensatory behavior for emotional deficits (Carton et al., 1995).  The 
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 presence of anhedonia may undermine other correlates with introversion and autism, including 
increased inhibition and decreased emotional response to strong stimuli.  Other researchers 
concur that the ability to experience and regulate emotions in alexithymia shows similar 
relationships with sensation-seeking and engagement in high-risk activities (Woodman et al., 
2009).  With emotional attenuation, increased stimulation is necessary for optimal arousal. 
 Extraversion has long been associated with sensation-seeking, as extraversion requires 
more stimulation to reach an “optimal level of stimulation” (Eysenck, 1967; Eysenck & 
Zuckerman, 1978).  However, it would appear that introversion may be conditionally related to 
excitement-seeking.  Analysis of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 
1975) reveals a “psychosis” dimension, defined as a trait that underlies that which may become 
clinical psychosis under certain circumstances.  Those who are expected to score high on this 
dimension include those with personality disorders and art students (Eysenck & Zuckerman, 
1978).  These individuals share “non-conforming, atypical attitudes indicating a lack of 
socialization or a weak ‘superego.’  …Sensation-seeking is also related to a similar 
dimension…” (p. 483).  Extraversion was found to correlate with disinhibition, but researchers 
also found lower correlations with thrill and adventure-seeking and insignificant ties to 
experience-seeking and boredom susceptibility.  Later conceptualizations that include 
“excitement-seeking” in components of extraversion (Costa & McCrae, 1992) may have simply 
included a conceptual indicator that is more aptly characterized as a correlate.  Yet, researchers 
prefer to include sensation-seeking in the definition of extraversion (Eysenck & Zuckerman, 
1978), despite the possibility of nonconforming alexithymics who are socially withdrawn.  
Perhaps emotionality requires subcategorization of introverted groups to account for some of the 
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 phenotypical differentiation between “impulsive” and “uninhibited” excitement-seekers and 
easily overwhelmed inhibited introverts with high sensory-processing sensitivity and lower 
optimal thresholds for stimulation. 
 Other areas of disjunction in introversion relate to task performance and the tendency to 
become overwhelmed by cognitive load; this is manifested by apparent inhibited response.  
Gooding and Talent (2003) find that working memory deficits associated with match-to-sample 
tasks involving spatial, identity, and cognitive information are not a result of social anhedonia, 
but appear to show the “difficulty and/or inefficiency in handling cognitively taxing tasks” (p. 
247).  Pontari and Schlenker (2000) find that extra cognitive work can either inhibit effective 
self-presentation by leaching necessary cognitive resources, or the challenge may facilitate self-
presentation by drawing attention from negative self-preoccupation.  Introverts who do not 
experience social anhedonia but do suffer from social anxiety and negative self-preoccupation 
and public self-consciousness may vary in task performance depending upon the difficulty 
involved if they may otherwise be hindered by their ruminative or fearful thoughts.  Fear can 
prevent action and elicit a withdrawal response.  However, one may not place oneself in these 
overwhelming situations with reduced efficacy in attention modulation.  Nor does anxiety 
predispose one to better handling of cognitive tasks or aesthetic orientation for distractive 
purposes.  Similarly, Stahl and Cheek (1993) note that compensatory gifts do not necessarily 
accompany shyness.  If attention-shifting is not possible, then the additional cognitive work is 
likely to be compromised while the negative self-reflection remains a point of inward attentional 
fixation.  The amount of additional work may also prove to be “overwhelming” and cause an 
introvert to “shut down” (Laney, 2002).  Inhibition may come from an inability to juggle 
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 multiple tasks, or it may be fear-based, thereby causing individuals to have different ways of 
overcoming the problem and to be affected in different ways and contexts. 
It is also possible that such affective differences cause relative inhibition or impulsivity 
depending upon both affective disposition and cognitive workload to distract from these 
processes, also subject to attentional capacity for such distraction.  Of course, in the social realm, 
inhibition may be due to anxiety with or without anhedonia.  As anhedonia is the inability to 
experience pleasure from social interactions, social anxiety may still be present.  Researchers 
have found strong correlations among measures of social anxiety and anhedonia (Park et al., 
2009).  This fits with reports from schizoid individuals who experience social anhedonia but 
privately feel painful sensations due to a lack of positive stimulation from relationships (DSM-
IV-TR).  Other research concurs that “shy people oscillate between social interest and fear while 
experiencing both approach and avoidance tendencies” (Stahl & Cheek, 1993, p. 5).  The lack of 
a pleasurable experience from socialization may be due to attention drawn to stressful aspects of 
social contact which cause the introvert to “pull back” (Laney, 2002, p. 3) from contact with the 
external world for modulation of stress-associated overstimulation as is the typical reaction to 
stressful events.  Whether a lack of skills or affective disturbance is the cause, the tendency for 
the introvert to feel “alone in a crowd” likely hinges on one’s social inhibition, from an inability 
to open oneself to emotional connection and/or from an inability to initiate, interpret, and 
maintain communication. 
 
Overstimulation and withdrawal 
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 Through the clinical lens of autism and schizophrenia, inhibited introversion appears to 
be the product of a withdrawal from activity for the purposes of avoiding overstimulation or 
possible anxiety.  In severe cases of autism, other factors, such as impaired intelligence and 
proper insight might render one incapable of this activity, but less severe forms closer to the 
introverted part of the spectrum are likely to involve multiple types of reactions that result in 
inhibitive reaction to stimuli.  This may happen proactively, as Temple Grandin (in Bogdashina, 
2003) describes tuning out information or shutting down receptiveness to stimuli, or it may 
happen retroactively as one withdraws instead of reacting, especially impulsively (Laney, 2002). 
Some of the relational pattern of anxiety and inhibition appears in earlier manifestations 
of inhibition.  Moehler and colleagues (2008) found that behavioral inhibition during the second 
year of life was predictive of anxiety later in life, especially as shown through exaggerated 
emotional disturbance and distress when exposed to novel stimuli.  The anxiety provoked by the 
presentation of novel stimuli shows early comorbidity of inhibition and anxiety.  Interestingly, 
the display of abnormal behavior seems to coincide with the time frame during which such 
behavior often first appears in autism.  Children who are diagnosed with autism spectrum 
disorders show inhibited behavioral patterns that start before the age of three (DSM-IV-TR). 
 
Vitality: What is inhibited? 
Part of the picture of inhibited introversion includes a somewhat conflicting concept.  The 
desire to react followed by restraint is inhibition, but a lack of desire to act, and therefore a lack 
of need for restraint, would be caused by lower energy levels.  Ryan and Frederick (1997) 
describe vitality as a feeling of energy and “aliveness,” reflective of well-being and constituted 
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 of psychological and somatic factors.  As this definition rests upon one’s perception of one’s 
state, those with insight into their perceptive abnormalities, or those who experience elevated 
anxiety and depression are unlikely to experience vitality or high energy. 
 
The behavioral inhibition system 
Other theorists refute the involvement of inhibitory mechanisms in autism partially and 
indirectly.  Carver and White (1994) describe Gray’s behavioral inhibition and behavioral 
activation systems.  The behavioral inhibition system is sensitive to stimuli that signal impending 
punishment, nonreward, and novelty.  As described, autistic individuals may be insensitive to 
cues that should elicit an anticipatory response, thereby precluding normal sensory focus and 
attenuation.  Yet, social anxiety is also predictive, even if through the anticipation of negative 
consequences.  Perhaps behavioral inhibition can support an argument for selective ability to 
anticipate and prepare for consequences, as is dependent upon attentional capabilities and areas 
of selective focus. 
 Apparent inhibition may also be delayed reaction to stimulus prompts.  For instance, the 
inability of the introvert to act in the moment and the preference to spend more time processing 
information before speaking or reacting (Laney, 2002; Aron & Aron, 1997) could account for 
seeming inhibition.  Decision-making and cognitive processing takes longer, so introverts may 
appear to be more inhibited, while extraverts can react more quickly and appear more impulsive. 
 
As perception and thought processes affect social and cognitive experience, anxiety helps 
shape these perceptions and function, and inhibition is a product of and contributor to patterns of 
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 narrowness and reduction in stimulation sought by introverts, wherever they appear on the 
autism spectrum and regardless of their unique balance of these factors.  The severity and exact 
manifestation of these traits, whether they appear as schizophrenia spectrum disorders, autism 
spectrum disorders, or the less severe and non-clinical form, introversion, is contingent upon 
both environmental and genetic factors. 
The complex and comprehensive four-factor view of the autism-introversion continuum 
demonstrates the importance of trait dynamic and interaction.  The current findings relating to 
introversion uphold the working model.  However, the autism-introversion continuum model 
with differential factorial weightings also introduces new questions: what causes these 
differences? What has research taught us about possible neural substrates and biological 
mechanisms that cause, result from, or contribute to the patterns that create observable behavior 
indicative of placement on this spectrum?  The following is a brief review of current research 
that exploits the continuum model to further inform our understanding of introversion and 
autism. 
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 CHAPTER 9: BIOLOGICAL CORRELATES 
 There are many factors that cause the manifest symptoms of autism and observable 
behaviors and preferences of introversion.  The interplay of the detailed factors and their relative 
weightings contributes to these tendencies.  This chapter outlines variables that contribute to 
expression of the introverted factors and those that may be researched by neurological studies to 
better understand differences from non-introverted groups. 
 Research has not yet offered conclusive evidence as to the cause of autism or 
introversion, but a genetic component has been suggested to interact with the environment in a 
way that may cause expression of autistic or introverted behavior.  Begley and Springen (1996) 
explain that an autistic individual’s identical twin is 90% likely to be autistic, as well.  
Additionally, they note that the infliction of brain damage causes the expression of autism, while 
the absence of trauma causes some idiosyncracies in behavior that are not classifiable as autism.  
The genetic predisposition appears to interact with the environment and with biological 
compromise in a way that causes expression of the disorder.  The incidence of introversion 
among families with autistic relatives should be explored.  Previous research has only examined 
the preponderance of related trait sets of “broader autism phenotype,” or mild autistic traits, in 
parents of autistic children (Scheeren & Stauder, 2008).  Social impairment is shown in fathers 
of autistic children, thereby strengthening the argument for an autistic predisposition in the 
family’s genetic code.  Research that includes introversion measures should be more sensitive 
and comprehensive. 
 
Heritability 
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  Introversion research has suggested heritability and a strong genetic component that is 
exacerbated when exposed to certain environmental conditions and may change the character 
(e.g., Eaves & Eysenck, 1975).  As these conditions are likely to change over the lifespan, 
expression changes accordingly with age.  McCrae and colleagues (2000) explain that 
temperaments are biologically-based.  These traits include emotional stability and 
thoughtfulness.  Factors such as introversion are “a constitutional predisposition” (p. 173).  As 
the genetic-environmental combination changes the unitary nature of the extraverted 
temperament (Eaves & Eysenck, 1975), researchers are unlikely to find conclusive evidence to 
support the unidimensionality of introversion and extraversion (Carrigan, 1960) despite other 
assertions that extraversion is a conceptually unitary temperament (e.g., Eysenck, 1967; Eaves & 
Eysenck, 1975).  While the conceptual simplicity is admirable, the necessary existence of 
confounding factors that make up our interactive existence renders this implausible.  
Nonetheless, the fluctuation and individual difference in weightings of introverted and 
extraverted components is an important statement of interactive potential. 
 
Emergence of variation in autistic/introverted patterns 
 The changing circumstances of life cause dispositional interaction with the environment 
to change over time and across cultures.  McCrae and colleagues (2004) studied these patterns.  
They find cultural differences and a general trend of increasing introversion over the life span.  
However, these data begin at age ten.  The autistic pattern would show marked increases in 
introversion prior to age three with the potential to develop more socially interactive behavior 
over the course of time, possibly due to development of social and linguistic skills.  The extent 
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 and general trend do appear to separate clinical autism from introversion.  However, a study that 
is based upon introverted trends and does not include extraverts’ data would be more useful as a 
comparative sample. 
 
A neuroscientific model: Current findings 
 The study of autistic brains might also help shape future studies of brain-behavior ties in 
introversion.  Introversion findings are mixed, but the potential for interesting insights into the 
temperament has been established.  The circadian abnormalities and variation in introversion-
extraversion response to stimulation levels have been explored with preliminary studies (as in 
Zuckerman, 2003), though the ability to draw fruitful conclusions rests upon refinement of 
technique.  EEG characteristics are highly heritable (Lykken, 1982a, 1982b), so such studies may 
lend important insight for introversion-extraversion patterns.  Other nervous system studies 
support lower excitability thresholds in introversion and greater response to stimulation.  
Cerebral blood flow patterns demonstrated higher cortical arousal in introverts than in extraverts 
(Mathew, Weinman, & Barr, 1984 in Zuckerman, 2003).  Extraverts showed reduced excitability 
as shown through reflex recovery, thereby demonstrating inhibitory nervous processes (Pivik, 
Stelmack, & Bylsma, 1988 in Zuckerman, 2003).  These designs may be applied to autistic 
samples for a relevant and interesting comparison group. 
 However, researchers conclude that results are mixed in understanding chemical, blood 
flow, and structural differences in introversion and extraversion (Zuckerman, 2003).  These 
differences may be resolved through exploration of other aspects of the temperaments, especially 
by using findings in neuroimaging of autism to guide exploration of introverted traits and 
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 tendencies.  Current work has shown some temperamental differences that could support 
differences in cognitive processes, movement, communication, and distribution of sensory 
information (Johnson et al., 1999).  As these findings are relatively vague, more work is 
necessary to understand the functional neuroanatomy of introverted brains, especially as they 
may compare to autistic samples.  Authors even note that “the present study did not provide a 
definitive answer concerning the relation between personality and brain activity” (p. 256).  
Wright and colleagues (2006) found differences between introversion and extraversion in 
neuroanatomical structure of the prefrontal cortex, without significant difference in the 
amygdala.  This may account for some executive and integrative differences in introversion and 
extraversion, but it does not support the emotional component that places lability as a result of 
overstimulation. 
Other studies also suggest the possibility of a biological basis of personality differences 
through differences in cortical arousal as measured by fMRI.  Kumari and colleagues (2004) 
found a negative relationship between extraversion and resting levels of cortical arousal.  They 
also point out a negative relationship between schizotypy and striatal activity, using the 
assumption that introversion is synonymous with this personality disorder.  As other variables 
impact the viability of these groups as comparison samples with inter-group differences shown 
using a psychometric measure by Eysenck intended to verify his theory, these findings need 
more empirical support. 
 Zuckerman (2003) concludes that neuroimaging for introversion is likely to be 
constrained due to the expense of the methods and resultant limitation of their application to the 
study of medical conditions.  Streamlining techniques and regions expected to be affected by 
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 comparison to the more extreme clinical sample may offer a valuable chance to understand the 
introverted brain based upon studies on clinical populations.  With phenotypic similarity, we 
should expect to find the same type of structure, function, and brain-behavior ties in introversion 
and in autism, but the difference would rest in the extent of manifestation, both in physiological 
findings and behavioral ramifications. 
 
Implications for future research 
Callosal hypoconnectivity 
Indeed, we do have some foundational information about the structure of the autistic 
brain.  Though only a cursory view is provided here, a brief overview is sufficient to demonstrate 
the potential of generalization of autistic findings to introverted findings. The proportion of gray 
matter might be secondary to its interconnections and supportive white matter.  Hardan and 
colleagues’ (2009) conclusion of significantly diminished cortical connectivity based upon 
overall diminution of the corpus callosum when explored regionally using volumetric 
comparison of MRIs may indicate a more important trend to understanding the neurophysiology 
that underlies the disease.  The corpus callosum is the major connective pathway between the 
hemispheres, allowing integration and modulation of information, especially for global 
perception.  Detail focus is one notable result of an inability to integrate information. 
As myelination of the corpus callosum occurs between six and eleven years of age 
(Thompson et al., 2000) and other phases of neuronal growth and axial patterning occur before 
this (Paul et al., 2007), it is possible that symptoms may appear after a period of normal growth 
(DSM-IV-TR) commensurate with a disruption of the stage of development of white matter tracts.  
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 Such processes, possibly combined with other interactive factors (such as neurotransmitter 
levels, environmental interaction, etc. as it acts with genetic factors) might mean that the actual 
volume of gray matter is less important to diagnosis.  The interaction that provides learning 
opportunities is altered, thereby altering the nature of the resultant connections (as are formed by 
learning) that support normal interaction.  The DSM-IV-TR notes the possibility of both 
macroencephaly and microencephaly in autism, while schizophrenia is often associated with 
diminishment of gray matter in the cortex, increased volume of the ventricles, and abnormal 
activity.  Individuals with autism may later be diagnosed with schizophrenia (DSM-IV-TR), so 
previous assumptions that they are on “opposite ends of the spectrum” or are inverses of each 
other (Crespi & Badcock, 2008) should be reconsidered.  In fact, some studies have already 
found evidence of an overlap of autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders, including genetic 
components and even perceived comorbidity of the diseases (Arehart-Treichel, 2008).  With such 
phenotypical similarities with introversion, perhaps those who are considered “extremely 
introverted” should be subject to empirical examination involving comparative brain scans, 
especially volumetric analyses of MRIs to explore possible micro- and macro-encephaly when 
compared to an “extraverted” group, and association and commissural tracts may be explored for 
diminishment commensurate with autistic disorder.  Interactivity with the environment, 
sensation, and movement abnormalities possibly tied to cerebellar involvement may also impact 
projection tracts. 
 
Abnormal activity 
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  Abnormal brain activity is possible in autism and schizophrenia.  Both diseases are linked 
with the increased potential for seizures (DSM-IV-TR; Hollander et al., 2009).  These abnormal 
patterns may be detected by EEG scans, or they may be indicative of disrupted activity from 
overstimulation and dysregulation.  While this has not been an area of focus as of yet, it would 
be interesting to note the prevalence of introversion or extraversion in epileptic patients in case 
there is a predisposition to the disease by temperament.  This possible connection has been 
informally supported by the tendency for introverts to feel overwhelmed by sensory input and to 
have lower stimulus thresholds.  Such stimulation may be linked to triggering an epileptic 
seizure, if the stimulus is strong and of long enough duration, but more work must be done to 
confirm such a claim. 
 
Neurotransmitters 
 Better understanding of the neuroanatomical, functional, and neuropharmacological 
differences in introversion and autism can also lead to better definition of both.  Hirsch and 
colleagues (2009) propose a new structure to refine the “big five” model of personality by 
introducing new “metatraits” to account for the interrelatedness they found among the standing 
five personality traits.  Their justification lies in the function of serotonin and dopamine systems 
as they impact incentive-based motivation and exploration (dopamine) and satiety and restraint 
(serotonin).  This model of engagement and restraint of behavior seems to revisit Gray’s 
behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation systems, and such lines of work should be 
reconsidered for better understanding of behavior correlates and their neural substrates. 
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 These findings may advance our understanding of interactions that produce the 
expression of autism, as well.  Our knowledge of the ways in which the environment and genetic 
factors, and the resultant traits interact, has progressed through clinical studies.  Brain-derived 
neurotrophic factor, which regulates synaptic plasticity and neurotransmission, has been 
correlated to expressions of introverted or extraverted temperament, and this work has already 
begun to elucidate interactions with genetic factors such as the serotonin transporter gene that 
cause correlated traits to be expressed (Terracciano et al., 2009).  As this research has found 
some possible causal interactions for neuroticism, it may help explain the introverted and 
neurotic factors that must be addressed for better adjustment of individuals on the introversion 
spectrum. 
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 CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
Commonalities between introverted and autistic trait heterogeneity: Support for a common 
trait dynamic 
Both autism and introversion are commonly described as “spectrum” phenomena.  Jung’s 
(1926) introversion-extraversion continuum allows for varying degrees of associated tendencies, 
much as the autism spectrum encompasses degrees of severity.  The two scales also share other 
important descriptive qualities.  The heterogeneity of introverted traits (e.g., Grimes, 2005) 
despite its definition as a unitary personality trait parallels that of autistic symptoms.  
Researchers find such variability to create practical problems in the clinical diagnosis of autism 
(Volkmar et al., 2008).  This prompted Ring and colleagues (2008) to explore the possibility of 
different subcategories of autism such that phenotypic variation suggested differences in etiology 
and clinical syndrome classification.  Psychometric analysis yielded results consistent with a 
singular spectrum model of autism with variability based upon severity and IQ. 
 Other interpretations may argue in favor of a factor model of introversion, as posited by 
Grimes (2005).  The new model would combine these introversion facets on a continuum that 
includes a clinical extreme end that produces different results based upon the interaction of the 
traits as they are combined with variable weighting.  A particular constellation of introverted 
traits, especially social, anxious, and inhibited introversion, when taken to the extreme, may also 
characterize autism.  However, the prominence of other introverted traits may be indicative of 
schizotypy.  These would include anxious, thinking, and social introversion, while omitting 
inhibited introversion such that schizophrenic impulsivity and disinhibition are present.  The 
DSM-IV-TR includes “introverted anhedonia” as a schizotypal trait, referring to a tendency 
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 toward attenuated emotion and social withdrawal with a lack of pleasure from social and 
physical stimulation.  Unstable mood and socially inappropriate behavior accompany a lack of 
adhesion to social norms, but reckless behavior and disjointed or discontinuous thought and 
trouble concentrating are also present.  Some studies show correlations between artistic creativity 
and schizophrenia (Rawlings & Locarnini, 2008), so “thinking introversion” and aesthetic 
orientation may be introverted traits more closely related to schizotypy than to autism, which is 
thought to cause diminished imagination and fantasy (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  The “social” 
introversion component is common to both disorders, though high-functioning autism may not 
impact one’s affiliative desire, even if one’s social skills are impaired (DSM-IV-TR).  Therefore, 
underlying cause or motivation for social withdrawal becomes important for how severity 
interacts with this introverted trait along various points of the continuum. 
 
Where schizophrenia fits in the model 
 The link among schizophrenia, autism, and introversion is a tenuous one, but it has 
already found some empirical support.  Nettle (2006) describes mathematical creativity as a 
product of a systemizing mind with narrow associations and appreciation for routine.  This 
constellation argues for a creative trend with low incidence of unusual experiences, 
disorganization, and impulsive nonconformity as would be found in schizophrenia, though he 
points out that these traits are characteristics found in Baron-Cohen’s (2003) systemizing model 
of autism spectrum disorders.  The tendency toward order and regularity and the aptitude for 
dealing with numerical values and concepts is characteristic of autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001), while unusual experiences and openness characteristic of visual arts and music appear to 
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 correlate higher with schizotypal traits (Rawlings & Locarnini, 2008).  Both creative types differ 
from their clinical correlates by the exclusion of introvertive anhedonia, but not by the degree of 
inclusion of the other traits (Nettle, 2006).  In this case, the introversion facet referenced is social 
and possibly anxious.  Social introversion may be indicative of the inclusion of other factors, or 
it could be a product of isolation due to ineptitude or lack of affliative motivation. 
 However, the link among the schizophrenia and autism spectra, and the introversion 
continuum might simply be a matter of degree of severity plotted as a function of developmental 
course.  Different components that make up introversion or autism are present with variation in 
weighting, creating an interaction that is unique to the individual.  As such, the dynamic created 
that forms the pattern of introversion also interacts with the environment through the body in 
different ways throughout the course of the life span, subjected to various stressors and trophic 
factors.  The timing and severity at various points in life, coupled with the exact pattern of 
factorial weightings creates the diagnosable phenomenon.  Autism spectrum disorders are early 
onset disorders, meaning that the child’s interactions are deeply disturbed from early in life, and 
all interactions through which the child would learn are compromised after the first year but 
before the second.  If such “overstimulation” takes place later in life, the result is likely to be 
different.  Hallucinations and delusions might be the result of a schism between one’s “inner 
world” and the outer world when divorcing oneself from the reality discovered by extensive 
interactivity that is the product of many years of “normal” function (according to the DSM-IV-
TR, onset is generally during the late twenties for women and mid-twenties for men).  The ways 
that one makes sense of this schism might produce these positive symptoms, while the retreat to 
the inner world more closely resembles the negative symptoms.  Autistic interactivity is much 
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 more limited and therefore shows a different overt behavior typified by developmental delay and 
continued behavior indicative of restricted interaction and learning.  The degree of 
overstimulation and one’s threshold, combined with the amount of “normal” interactivity to date 
could produce what we would call autism versus schizophrenia or any other trait set under the 
umbrella that appears to be the “quirky” but perhaps clinical umbrella of “introversion.” 
 
Subcategorization assisted by neurological experimentation 
Our ability to subcategorize may be assisted further through comparative fMRI such that 
the characteristic enlargement of the ventricles and diminishment of gray matter (especially in 
frontal and temporal areas) in schizophrenia or macroencephaly with comparative diminished 
volume of the corpus callosum and other white tracts in autism (Hardan et al., 2009) could be 
compared to samples of creative individuals who do not exhibit clinical symptoms of either 
disease.  Findings associated with clinical disorders may guide future studies involving non-
clinical introversion.  The introversion results may also provide us with a better expectation of 
ideal outcomes, as therapy may create functional neuroanatomical similarity to introversion, but 
the clinical brain may simply never wire similarly to that of an extravert.  Understanding 
improvement of severely introverted brains might help us understand how to deal with greater 
impairment in cortical connectivity, for example (as is argued to be an underlying problem in 
autism by Hardan et al., 2009). 
 
Subcategorization and behavior  
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 From these findings, it would seem that the inclusion of “introversion” and inappropriate 
affect, whether blunted or incongruent, characterize the schism between creativity and clinical 
classification.  This form of “introversion” appears to refer primarily to social introversion with 
some implicit thinking and anxious components.  However, social introversion has been widely 
demonstrated as a non-clinical personality trait, and it has also been found in non-clinical 
creative populations (Nettle, 2006; Rawlings & Locarnini, 2008).  Therefore, it would seem 
more plausible to conceptualize introversion as a multifaceted construct with different 
weightings of the various components that yield individual differences on one end of the 
spectrum and arrays of clinical symptomology on the other.  We may also use this model to 
better comprehend creativity and how the brain supports it. 
 
Terminological confusion reframed as a function of unrecognized synonymity 
Placing introversion and autism on the same spectrum allows for expansion of the trait set 
into a non-clinical population and refinement of both concepts.  The pressure to accomplish both 
of these goals has piqued in clinical literature (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the ballooning 
popular psychology literature that seeks to find a place for introversion and to build a 
nomological network for the elusive construct.  Operational similarities as those between 
Laney’s (2002) introversion scale and Baron-Cohen and colleagues’ (2001) Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient only begin to hint at the pervasive and necessary similarities that result from variance in 
terminology that only explains a difference in extent and not in inclusive trait set. 
Resultant connotations also seem to favor the use of a singular continuum to describe 
autism spectrum and schizophrenia spectrum disorders and introversion spectrum temperament.  
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 McWilliams (2006) specifically avoids use of the term “introversion” in favor of the use of 
“schizoid” to describe the introverted temperament.  She refers to a non-clinical population, but 
also notes that the application of a term that is traditionally associated with clinical pathology 
due to extent of expression to the point of maladaptive behavior to a similar trait set that is not 
thereby classifiable as “clinical” is not favored.  The clinical term is stigmatizing, but it is more 
descriptive.  She says of those with schizoid personalities,  
“…There is a range of mental and emotional health in such people that runs from 
psychotically disturbed to enviably robust.  Although I have become persuaded that 
schizoid individuals do not have ‘neurotic-level’ conflicts (cf. Steiner, 1993), I note that 
the highest functioning schizoid people, of whom there are many, seem much healthier in 
every meaningful respect…  Although the Jungian concept of ‘introversion’ is perhaps a 
less stigmatizing term, I prefer ‘schizoid’ because it implicitly refers to the complex 
intrapsychic life of the introverted individual rather than to a preference for introspection 
and solitary pursuits, which are more or less surface phenomena.” (pp.1-2). 
 
While some of these aspects of a “rich inner life” (Aron & Aron, 1997) are present in 
introversion, the use of additional terms that are introduced to indicate some perceivable aspect, 
or subset thereof, of introversion only obfuscates the study of these terms and their 
interrelationship.  Instead of distinguishing these presumed correlates and theoretically 
preventing overlap as Aron and Aron have done with high sensory processing sensitivity for the 
purposes of claiming novelty, perhaps we must finally integrate what we know and set forth a 
model based upon these facts and not upon personal biases. 
 
Goals for future research 
Understanding the “rich inner life” 
 We must increase our understanding of both autism and introversion in order to advance 
studies of both, and to understand critical and tangential issues facing psychology.  Introversion 
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 does not make sense, especially in its variation from person to person and from idiosyncratic 
results of application to differing situations and environments.  Murphy (1947) describes an 
introverted boy who exemplified Jung’s definition of the construct in his preferences, tendencies, 
and the creation and maintenance of a “preposterously rich fantasy world” (p. 609), but his IQ 
was only 65.  Such an example demonstrates clear overlap with the definition of autism, 
including the impairment in intelligence.  It also demonstrates that the presumed empty inner life 
of one who could be diagnosed with autism may be richer than believed by others.  Perhaps we 
must refine our understanding of the inner life of introverts and autistic patients. 
 
Understanding intelligence 
 The problem with our understanding clearly involves our definition and use of 
comparison groups, but it also involves our measurement capabilities.  Murphy’s introverted 
child may have tested with inferior intelligence on standard measures of intelligence, but a rich 
inner life requires intelligence.  Perhaps this inner world is the manifestation of a sort of 
intelligence that cannot be effectively communicated or shown socially, since these skills were 
not present prior to onset of the most severe symptomology (and withdrawal).  The autistic 
aptitude for detail orientation and rule-bound or numerical manipulation hints toward a different 
sort of intelligence that may be difficult for one with communicative problems to express.  It is 
also probable that this type of intelligence is not supported by standard communication.  For 
instance, if this inner world is full of concepts and vivid imagery, verbal description can only be 
as effective as one’s vocabulary and eloquence will allow, and depictions through other media 
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 requires sufficient artistic or other skills.  Perhaps our comparison of clinical and non-clinical 
intelligence is an unfair measure of standard intelligence moderated by communicative ability. 
 
Examining related constructs 
 The factorial structure of autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders and description of 
severity offered by a continuum model allows for flexibility in description and diagnosis (e.g., 
Ring et al., 2008; Karakula et al., 1999; Gruzelier, 1996; Raine, 1990) and for extension of these 
traits into a non-clinical population with less severe expression and non-clinical trait interaction 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Rust, 1988).  Recently, factor approaches to introversion have proven 
comprehensive and descriptively better, as even unifaceted models of introversion and 
extraversion have not been proven to work empirically as unitary tools (e.g., Carrigan, 1960; 
Cheek et al., 2009; Grimes, 2005).  If the continuum approach is tempered to accommodate these 
findings, we may have a more comprehensive view of introversion.  The temperament also 
begins to more closely resemble the non-clinical end of the autism and schizophrenia spectrum. 
Autism and introversion exist on the same continuum; while some overlap with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders is indicated, the ways in which these continua overlap should 
be better explored.  The autism-introversion continuum model is offered to simplify a complex 
and dynamic representation of personality.  The palette of introversion is the same as for these 
clinical conditions, but the personality is painted in lighter hues, as the withdrawal into the inner 
world is not absolute and the trait set is attenuated in expression as a result and as a causal factor.  
Schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders require different weightings of components set in 
different situational dynamics to create these different constellations, and the introverted 
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 temperament describes a lighter weighting of all components preserved by a supportive 
situational flux.  Clinical conditions demonstrate heavier and/or imbalanced component 
weightings.  These components refer to social, thinking, anxious, and inhibited aspects and 
approaches, and it must also include other related but important parts of the personal dynamic, 
including affect, stimulation threshold, sensitivity, etc.  The interplay of these traits are subject to 
variation in expression, accounting for individual difference and difference in individual 
“growth.”   
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 CHAPTER 11: FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In order to justify the new model of introversion and autism and subsequent empirical 
exploration thereof, I propose a correlational psychometric study to assess the presence, degree, 
and nature of the relationship of measures of introversion and autism in individuals diagnosed 
with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome, introversion, and extraversion.  Three 
groups of participants should be matched for age, gender, and cultural backgrounds.  These 
groups will be self-reported extraverts, introverts, and clinically-diagnosed high-functioning 
autism spectrum disorder.  For the purpose of simplicity and to avoid the confounding problem 
of administering too many measures to an easily overwhelmed population, schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders and measures designed for the assessment thereof should not be included in 
this preliminary study.  Further support for the generalizability for these results including the 
correlation of autism and schizophrenia measures for individuals with mild symptoms of both 
disorders should form the hypothetical framework of follow-up studies.  
Each participant will be individually administered each measure in a single sitting and in 
a quiet and isolated environment.  It is estimated that a complete administration of the three 
instruments will take 30- 60 minutes.  Subjects will be asked questions from the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient, Introversion Scale, and Highly Sensitive person Scale, and investigators will 
assist in indicating the score on a response sheet. 
The autism measure, the Autism Spectrum Quotient (ASQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is 
a self-administered questionnaire designed to assess the presence of traits characteristic of autism 
spectrum disorder in adults of normal intelligence.  The ASQ is made up of five subscales that 
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 explore areas of social skill, attention-switching, attention to detail, communication, and 
imagination.  A copy of the ASQ is provided in the Appendix. 
Laney’s (2002) Introversion Scale is a questionnaire designed to assess traits 
characteristic of introversion in adults.  These include items that assess hypersensitivity, the 
tendency to become over-stimulated and consequent withdrawal, narrow interests, a preference 
of depth over breadth in pursuits, and social emotional qualities.  A copy of the Introversion 
Scale is provided in the Appendix. 
The Highly Sensitive Person Scale (Aron & Aron, 1997) is a measure of high sensory 
processing sensitivity.  Items target hypersensitivity, aesthetic orientation, the tendency to 
become frazzled and overwhelmed and subsequent withdrawal and self-isolation, a preference 
for solitude, and attention to detail.  It has been found to correlate with introversion measures 
(Grimes, 2005), and it is conceptually linked to introversion (Laney, 2002).  However, the nature 
of these items also suggests significant overlap with the Autism Spectrum Quotient. 
Established scales of introverted factors are selected to represent the conceptual realm of 
the domain factors for introversion, explored by Grimes (2005), based upon high loadings in 
each of the four factors/subtypes: social, thinking, anxious, and inhibited introversion.  To keep 
the measures concise and to avoid overwhelming the subject, specific items are taken that are 
conceptually most pertinent to the factors as defined in the establishing study (Grimes, 2005).  
These items will be correlated by domain with Laney’s (2002) Introversion Scale, Aron and 
Aron’s (1997) measure of high sensory processing sensitivity, and the Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  Each domain will be compared to scores from the ASQ 
and Introversion, as it is expected that some domains will show a stronger correlation with both 
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 of these measures than will others: specifically, social, anxious, and inhibited introversion have 
been found to correlate more strongly with the Introversion scale than did the “thinking” domain 
factor (Grimes, 2005).  However, as previously stated, the nature of thought may vary, thereby 
causing some measures to be more sensitive to the type of “thinking introversion” that is 
exhibited. 
 The first domain of introversion focuses on the social tendency to prefer “depth” to 
“breadth” in social relationships.  Laney (2002) characterizes an introvert as one who prefers 
solitary activities, requires “alone time,” and enjoys a limited amount of social interaction with a 
few close companions.  Larger social settings and broad networks of interpersonal interaction 
can be found to be overwhelming, and they are specifically avoided.  The “social introversion” 
domain factor is best represented by Burger’s (1995) Preference for Solitude Scale and the 
Positive Stimulation subscale of Hill’s (1987) Interpersonal Orientation Scale.  Burger focuses 
on how time spent in isolation affects individuals and the valence of these consequences.  
Individuals vary in enjoyment of time spent alone, demonstrating that some prefer solitude.  
Hill’s (1987) scale takes a somewhat different approach.  “Positive stimulation” is a specific type 
of affiliation motivation, based upon Murray’s (1938, as cited in Hill, 1987) model, and it arises 
from one’s feeling of gratification from close relationships.  The affective and cognitive 
stimulation that results from affection, love, belongingness, and intimacy drive people to seek 
interpersonal relationships.  However, the drive for positive social stimulation is conjectured to 
be reduced in populations that have a low affiliative need.  The preference for solitude and need 
for positive stimulation are expected to correlate negatively, but the target population is 
conjectured to have higher preference for solitude scores and lower affiliative need scores. 
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 The following items have been selected to represent the social introversion domain 
factor: 
Burger (1995) Preference for Solitude Scale 
1) I enjoy being around people 
I enjoy being by myself 
4) After spending a few hours surrounded by a lot of people, I usually find myself 
stimulated and energetic 
After spending a few hours surrounded by a lot of people, I am usually eager to get away 
by myself 
6) I often have a strong desire to get away by myself 
I rarely have a strong desire to get away by myself 
9) If I were to take a several-hour plane trip, I would like to sit next to someone who was 
pleasant to talk with 
If I were to take a several-hour plane trip, I would like to spend the time quietly 
11) I have a strong need to be around other people 
I do not have a strong need to be around other people 
 
Positive Stimulation subscale of the Interpersonal Orientation Scale (Hill, 1987): 
1) One of my greatest sources of comfort when things get rough is being with other 
people 
14) I find that I often have the desire to be around other people who are experiencing the 
same thing I am when I am unsure of what is going on 
20) I think it would be satisfying if I could have very close friendships with quite a few 
people 
21) I often have a strong desire to get people I am around to notice me and appreciate 
what I am like 
23) I usually have the greatest need to have other people around me when I feel upset 
about something 
25) I would find it very satisfying to be able to form new friendships with whomever I 
liked 
 
 The second domain of interest is “thinking introversion,” or a pattern of thought that 
reflects a cognitive component of turning energy inward, resulting in introspection.  The Big 
Five Inventory’s “Openness” subscale measures one’s broad thinking and desire for novel 
experience .  While introversion does focus energy inward for thought, it is defined by a 
tendency toward deep focus in few areas of interest.  The translation of this concept to the realm 
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 of thought should produce low openness scores correlating to introversion.  As autism is 
commonly associated with an aversion to novelty, it is expected that ASQ scores will likewise 
correlate negatively with items from this scale. 
Davis’s (1983) conceptualization of empathy includes a “fantasy” component that reflects 
simulation applied to theory of mind.  This trait would cause one to be able to readily use fantasy 
to enhance empathic comprehension of the experiences of another.  The tendency to create 
scenarios and ideas result in emotional reactions, physical arousal, and consequent altruistic 
behavior.  Laney’s introversion scale has only shown a moderate correlation with this scale 
(r=0.28, p<.01; Grimes, 2005).  However, its importance to the theoretical conceptualization of 
introversion necessitates the inclusion of key items in the present research, and similar 
correlations are expected for both the ASQ and Introversion Scale with Fantasy items. 
The final “thinking introversion” scale items to be used are from the Private Self-
Consciousness subscale of the Self-consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).  
The subscale is intended to measure direction of attention inward to the self and one’s inner 
thoughts and feelings.  While thinking about others as measured by the Fantasy scale allows for a 
creation of inner thought and placement of the self in an imagined situation, self-consciousness 
refers to a type of reflective thought that centers on the self and one’s own experiences, not upon 
one’s experiences of another’s situation.  Therefore, both scales are referenced for “thinking 
introversion” items. 
The following items have been selected to represent the thinking introversion domain 
factor: 
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 Openness Scale of the Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) 
5) Is original, comes up with new ideas 
10) Is curious about many different things 
15) Is ingenious, a deep thinker 
20) Has an active imagination 
35) Prefers work that is routine 
40) Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
 
Fantasy Scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983): 
1) I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me 
11) I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective 
26) When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me 
 
Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, (1975) Private Self-Consciousness Subscale of the Self-
consciousness Scale 
16) I know the way my mind works when I work through a problem 
35) I enjoy analyzing my own thoughts and ideas about myself 
 
The “anxious” domain of introversion includes negative thought items.  This may include 
depression items, as well, as more extensive study has found strong negative correlations among 
anxiety measures such as the Shyness Scale (Cheek & Melchoir, 1990) and the Positive 
Emotions and Assertiveness subscales of the NEO-PI (Grimes, 2005).  For the purposes of the 
present study, this domain is represented with its strongest conceptual correlates: the Shyness 
Scale (Cheek & Melchoir, 1990), the Rumination Subscale of the Reflection-Rumination 
Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), and the Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale (Hendin & 
Cheek, 1997). 
Shyness is commonly mistaken for introversion, though it was conceptually separated 
from low sociability and introversion by Cheek and Melchoir (1990).  The scale measures social 
anxiety, including self-critical and ruminative thought pertaining to social situations, feelings 
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 about social situations and others’ perceptions of the self, and resultant preferences top avoid 
anxiety-provoking situations. 
 Trapnell and Campbell (1999) argue that reflection can also be associated with 
psychological distress if the self-attention is not an intellectual consideration, but instead these 
self-thoughts are neurotic and anxiety-ridden.  Rumination refers to these negative self-thoughts, 
which can be continued, obsessive, and self-critical. 
 Hypersensitive narcissism measures covert narcissism, which Hendin and Cheek (1997) 
define as “vulnerability” and “oversensitivity.”  Thoughts are self-directed, but may be indicative 
of negative social motivation and interaction. 
 Collectively, these measures present a possible basis for difficulty in establishment of 
social relationships, and they may provide insight as to commonalities of underlying social 
factors in autism and introversion. 
 The following items represent the anxious introversion domain factor: 
Cheek & Melchoir (1990) Shyness Scale items: 
1) I feel tense when I'm with people I don't know well 
3) I am socially somewhat awkward 
5) I am often uncomfortable at parties and other social gatherings 
14) I often have doubts about whether other people like to be with me 
20) I feel inhibited in social situations 
 
Trapnell & Campbell (1999) 
Rumination Questionnaire 
6) I seem to "ruminate" or dwell over things that happen to me for a very long time 
afterward 
 
Hendin & Cheek (1997) Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale 
2) My feelings are easily hurt by ridicule or the slighting remarks of others 
5) I dislike being with a group unless I know that I am appreciated by at least one of 
those present 
8) I easily become wrapped up in my own interests and forget the existence of others 
18) I try to avoid rejection at all costs 
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 Hans Eysenck included two components in his description of extraversion: impulsivity 
and sociability (Eaves & Eysenck, 1975).  The “impulsivity” factor includes both impulsivity or 
excitement-seeking and a high activity level.  The extraverted impulsivity explored by the Buss 
& Plomin (1975) EASI subscales of activity and impulsivity should show a negative correlation 
with autism and introversion, thereby demonstrating inhibited introversion. 
 The NEO-PI Excitement-seeking and Activity facets also address these extraverted 
components, based in part on Buss and Plomin’s work, and reliant upon the same underlying 
theory.  Sample items from these scales demonstrate the lower levels of activity, excitement-
seeking, and impulsivity indicative of the construct of inhibited introversion as conceptually 
defined (Laney, 2002). 
 The following items will be used to represent the inhibited introversion domain: 
Buss & Plomin (1975)  
EASI Temperament Survey (Emotionality, Activity, Sociability, Impulsivity) 
1) For relaxation I like to slow down and take things easy (Reverse-scored) 
3) I like to keep busy all the time 
 
Costa & McCrae (1992) NEO-PI Excitement-seeking subscale of the Extraversion scale: 
5) I often crave excitement 
17) I sometimes have done things just for "kicks" or "thrills" 
29) I like to be where the action is 
35) I love the excitement of roller coasters 
41) I'm attracted to bright lights and flashy styles 
 
Costa & McCrae (1992) NEO-PI Activity subscale of the Extraversion scale 
22) I often feel as if I'm bursting with energy 
28) I'm not as quick and lively as other people 
46) I am a very active person 
 
The primary statistical analysis will consist of total group means and standard deviations 
for each measure, and correlational analyses of the group responses on all three measures, and 
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 analysis of variance to compare the results of each group to other groups.  In addition, an 
exploratory factor analysis will be performed on the Introversion Scale and Highly Sensitive 
Person Scale measures to explore multidimensionality of the scales when administered to a 
population of participants diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder versus introversion.  Grimes 
(2005) found two distinct factors in the introversion measure, while Cheek and colleagues (2009) 
found two independent factors in the high sensory processing sensitivity scale.  Application of 
the measures may demonstrate particular facets that correlate with greater strength with the 
Autism Spectrum Quotient and its subscales, or administration to a clinical population could 
unify the scales as the previous studies on non-clinical participants did not.  A “unitary” 
construct of introversion (as refuted in Carrigan, 1960) may solidify as projected by Laney 
(2002) with the autistic sample more than has been found in previous research conducted in non-
clinical populations (e.g., Grimes, 2005). 
The autism, introversion, and high sensory-processing sensitivity measures are expected 
to show a strong positive correlation, especially in the autistic group.  However, the factorial 
structure of introversion may cause some differentiation in weightings of the characteristics that 
may diminish the correlation in the non-clinical populations, especially in the extraverted group.  
Therefore, some introverts may have a higher activity level, for example, while some extraverts 
may describe themselves as shy (Zimbardo, 1977).  The traits that make up “introversion” are 
expected to demonstrate a stronger correlation to each other and to autism with greater strength 
of expression: for example, more social withdrawal, more inward thought orientation, and less 
comfort with novelty should reinforce the other features, while less social withdrawal may still 
correlate with less thinking introversion, though the neuroticism traits need not disappear. 
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 The reason for the dissolution of the trait set as introversion diminishes along the 
continuum is that interaction creates the phenomenon.  Factors are expected to fall apart as 
introversion continues to extraversion because the interdependent trait set disappears.  
Extraversion is defined as the absence of introversion, as it is the outward projection of energetic 
focus as opposed to the introverted or inward-projected focus of energy.  Therefore, the 
personality that emerges is not necessarily the inverse as trait interaction and environmental-trait 
interaction combine to produce a qualitatively distinct result with different temperaments.  
Additionally, the absence of the introverted trait set would cause other factors that normally 
function but are not dominant over the pattern that characterizes introversion to be allowed 
expression.  The pattern we call “extraversion” may not be the opposite trait constellation of 
introversion, but simply that which occurs in the absence of it.  Other motivating factors can 
cause overt behavior that resembles some facet of introversion, thereby producing the “shy 
extravert” (Zimbardo, 1977), for example, and other similar phenomena.  However, the 
combination of effects of the tendency to project attention (and therefore, energy) coupled with 
the relative dominance of other traits, trait-trait interaction, and trait-environment interaction are 
most likely to cause the idiosyncratic pattern of introversion or extraversion. 
Extraversion is the opposite of introversion from the primary perspective of initial 
energetic channeling, but real world interactions and other confounding variables create a 
completely different set of tendencies that do not interrelate in the same way.  Even one change 
of a secondary characteristic is likely to cause notable variation in observable behavior due to the 
way it interacts with all other parts of personality.  As such, the nature of this interaction 
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 underscores the importance of the synthesis and unitary functionality of a personality, not a 
component-by-component model that could be realistic in its dynamic. 
Pending successful completion of this exploratory study through the finding of empirical 
support of the placement of introversion and autism on the same continuum, further examination 
of this relationship should follow.  We may compare neuroanatomical structures in autism and 
introversion, as through the volumetric analysis of MRI used by Hardan and colleagues (2009).  
Further studies could study fMRI images as introverted and autistic individuals complete tasks, 
and eye-tracking could be used to compare eye-gaze and saccadic scanning similarities and 
differences in introverted and autistic groups.  We may find differences in sensory threshold, 
primary sensitivity, and aesthetic orientation in both groups, and we may even learn more about 
the creative process and how creative thinking functions.  Unlimited opportunities are possible 
for research to improve understanding of both clinical conditions and the related basic 
temperaments using a revised model as a foundation, and a centuries-old enigma may finally 
begin to work toward a more fruitful resolution simply through the use of a new approach. 
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